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 The promotion of democracy in the Arab world, an area to date resistant to 
effective political liberalization, has become a central pillar in American Middle East 
foreign policy as well as an integral element in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). 
How will this advocacy of democracy be received, given our theoretical and historical 
knowledge? The underlying assumption of U.S. policy is that democracy will moderate 
some of the anti-American sentiments from the region as well as undermine terrorist 
activities and support. Will overt American promotion of democracy cause these states to 
democratize? Using aspects of social movement theory, this thesis examines Arab 
reactions to public American promotion of democracy. I argue that America’s campaign 
is counterproductive because it has polarized the political discourse, a result which 
weakens potential sources of internal pressure and distorts understandings of democracy, 
thus facilitating states’ maintenance of the status quo. It does this through framing the 
message as inherently American and spurring opposing movements. Using al-Jazeera 
data derived from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), I recorded the 
connotations associated with each articulation of the word “democracy” to create a 
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1 
I. U.S. DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AND AL JAZEERA:  
A VIEW INTO ARAB REACTIONS AND OPPOSING 
MOVEMENTS  
The promotion of democracy in the Arab world has become a central pillar in 
American Middle East foreign policy as well as an integral element in the Global War on 
Terrorism (GWOT). Since the September 11 attacks, America has become convinced that 
redressing the Middle East’s democratic deficiency is necessary to contain terrorism. 
President George W. Bush expressed his conviction that the attacks did not represent a 
one time occurrence; rather that the terrorists began a volley still in play. Terrorism is a 
long term problem, Bush reasoned, which requires long term solutions.1 Democracy is the 
solution. To oppose terrorism America must support and promote democratic transitions 
throughout the Middle East.2 Bush’s underlying assumption is that democracy will 
moderate some of the anti-American sentiments from the region as well as undermine 
terrorist activities and support.  
Yet the Middle East region to date has proved resistant to effective political 
liberalization. How will U.S. advocacy of democracy be received, given our theoretical 
and historical knowledge? Some democracy scholars claim that America’s efforts are ill-
fated, arguing that democracy cannot be imposed if there is no affinity for it within the 
local population.3 Implicitly they are stating that either the population or the religion is 
adverse to democracy. However, Middle Easterners’ opinion polls have shown that the 
majority of the people favor a democratic political system, as 80 percent of Jordanians 
have declared.4 Contrary to claims that democracy is unsuited to the region, Arab 
intellectuals have gone so far as to say that it is the only acceptable and legitimate 
                                                 
1.  “U.S., World Safer Since September 11th, 2001, Bush Says,” United States Consulate Mumbai-
India, http://usembassy.state.gov/mumbai/wwwhwashnews2090.html (accessed 11 March 2005).  
2. Ibid.  
3. Larry Diamond, “Promoting Democracy,” Foreign Policy, no. 87 (Summer 1992), 27. 
4. Max Boot, “Our Extreme Makeover,” Los Angeles Times, 27 July 2005, 
http://www.cfr.org/pub8271/max_boot/our_extreme_makeover.php (accessed 19 August 2005). 
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political system today, theoretically reconciling democracy with Islam.5 Such a 
perspective supports the region’s favorable view of democracy, which would seem to 
bode well for America’s efforts to promote democratic political systems. Thus, one 
would expect the region to applaud American pressure on its states to implement 
democratic reforms, a result that has not occurred to date. How can we explain this 
unexpected outcome?  
While America’s intentions are good and based on reasonable logic, I argue that 
the country’s overt promotion of democracy in the Middle East is counterproductive 
since it has polarized the political discourse, a result which frustrates and distorts 
understandings of democracy, in the end facilitating states’ maintenance of the status quo. 
It does this through spurring opposing movements and framing the democracy message 
as inherently American. Al Jazeera, the most popular Arab satellite television station,6 is 
one site where frame contests become apparent. In this forum, America’s frame is 
attacked and alternatives are proposed. In this thesis, I first examine if and how Middle 
Easterners’ understanding of democracy has changed subsequent to the Bush 
administration’s promotion of democracy in the region. Second, I investigate whether a 
contest over public meanings of democracy exists. Third, I discuss how frame contests 
may impact Arab states’ policy choices.  
This thesis contributes to a greater understanding of the impact of overt American 
democracy promotion in the Middle East by not only describing how the region is 
reacting, but also by presenting some statistical evidence – it does this by looking at 
frames and frame contests. A frame is a packaged assessment of a situation and reflects 
                                                 
5.  Ali R. Abootalebi, “Islam, Islamists, and Democracy,” Middle East Review International 
Affairs, vol. 3, no. 1 (March 1999), http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1999/issue1/jv3n1a2.html (accessed 12 
March 2005), and Abdou Filali-Ansary, “Muslims and Democracy” in The Global Divergence of 
Democracies, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 
45. 
6. In a 2004 survey of the region, Zogby International found that most satellite viewers watched 
al Jazeera for international news  62 percent in Jordan, 54 per cent in Morocco, 46 percent in the United 
Arab Emirates, and 44 percent in Saudi Arabia and Lebanon. Information from: Benjamin Duncan, “Poll 
Reveals Arabs’ True Feelings on US,” Al-Jazeera, 26 July 2004, http://english.aljazeera.net, (accessed 10 
May 2005), Samantha M. Shapiro, “The War Inside the Arab Newsroom,” New York Times, 2 January 
2005, http://faculty.washington.edu/pnhoward/teaching/mms/arabnewsroom.pdf, and Khaled Dawoud, 
“Arab Opinions,” Al- Ahram Weekly, no. 701 (29 July- 4 August 2004),    
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/701/in2.htm  (accessed 8 September 2005). 
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one’s position on an issue or a world view. For instance, the U.S.’s frame for promoting 
democracy could be interpreted as “Stop Terrorism, Spread Democracy.” A frame contest 
is a competitive struggle between opposing movement activists (i.e. pro-democracy and, 
anti-democracy) for frame supremacy. Alternatively, frame contests are intrinsic to 
opposing movement dynamics.  To clarify and for the purpose of this thesis, democracy 
consists of two parts; one is the concept, and the other is a foreign policy (see Figure 2). 
This foreign policy is the U.S.’s democracy promotion. The frames recorded reflect this 
distinction. Specifically, favorable and unfavorable frames are expressions that address 
one or both sub-elements of democracy. Favorable frames are expressions that are 
supportive of the concept of democracy. Favorable frames do not address the foreign 
policy component. Unfavorable frames are expressions that reject or criticize the foreign 
policy component.  Unfavorable frames do not generally address the concept of 
democracy, but when a perspective is expressed it is ambivalent. As one may accurately 
discern, uses of the word “democracy” which are favorable do not mean expressed 
support for American democracy promotion.  
The statistical evidence for this thesis is gathered by reviewing 576 records of 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service’s (FBIS) transcription of al Jazeera satellite 
television station. The timeframe studied is 1 January 1998 to 1 September 2005; 1,373 
data points are registered. The data points are derived by isolating, analyzing, and 
recording how the word “democracy” is used (or its connotation) with each articulation. 
Each articulation reflects a particular frame or understanding. Thus, in recording the 
various expressions, a sample of competing frames is possible to capture developing 
trends of how the region is responding to America’s call for democracy. The data is 
organized in the following categories: pro-democracy, critical of American democracy, 
anti-American democracy (emotional), and neutral. Chapter III covers the thesis’ 
methodology in greater detail. In this chapter, I begin by reviewing the importance of 
democracy, and then examine the literature on democracy promotion in the Middle East. 
I subsequently present some of the research’s theoretical framework on the competitions 
over framing democracy as well as some of this study’s findings, and, finally, I discuss 
the policy implications of this thesis.  
4 
A. IMPORTANCE OF DEMOCRACY 
Democracy is not just an abstract or romanticized idea; it offers domestic as well 
as international advantages. Tangible benefits are associated with state incorporation of 
democratic practices and institutions. Historically, some scholars maintain that 
democracies have been more consistent and effective in promoting stable economic 
growth than other types of political systems.7 While democracies maintain reasonably 
strong and stable economic growth, authoritarian regimes vary in extremes  either very 
good or very bad.8 Trust is necessary for markets to function efficiently and attract 
investment. This entails confidence based on property rights, the rule of law, and 
competition  factors authoritarianism stifles.  
Further, democracies may be better at providing citizens’ need. In Sen’s now 
famous study comparing China and India regarding food shortages, India’s democracy 
was found superior through the accountability generated by a free press, compelling the 
government to find effective solutions to avoid famine. Meanwhile, China – financially 
better positioned but lacking the pressure of a free press – allowed a famine to last for 
three years, with the resulting death toll of nearly 30 million people. Of the recorded 
famines worldwide, none occurred in democracies in which the media functioned as a 
counterbalance against the state. 9   
An additional factor in favor of democratic politics is that its inclusiveness 
tempers extremism and promotes the continuance of the democratic regime itself. Social 
movement scholars posit that democracies undermine state opponents’ violent attacks of 
the system by offering these actors opportunities to make changes from within the 
system. This opening creates a dilemma for state opponents: if they attack the state in 
spite of its conciliatory stance, they risk losing popular support or alienating their 
sympathizers. If they decline the opportunity to participate politically, they may miss the 
                                                 
7. Giovanni Sartori, “How Far Can Free Government Travel?” in The Global Divergence of 
Democracies, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 
57.  
8. Jeff Madrick, “Democracy Has the Edge When It Comes to Advancing Growth,” New York 
Time, 13 April, 2000, http://www.stanford.edu/~wacziarg/articles/nytdemoc/nytdemoc.html (accessed 11 
December 2004). 
9. Amartya Sen, “Democracy as a Universal Value” in The Global Divergence of Democracies, 
ed.  Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 7-8.  
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chance to gain credibility “legitimately” and alter the system in their favor. Given the 
difficulty and uncertainty of overhauling an entrenched system, an invitation to 
participate politically is alluring to state opponents. Additionally, because democracies 
set the parameters for protest, they provide manageable outlets for expressing grievances. 
By co-opting competing actors into one system, democracies are able to diffuse attacks of 
the system and compel co-opted opponents to commit to the survival of the system.10   
In the international arena, political scientists found a strong negative correlation 
between democracies and the outbreak of fighting. They conclude that, as the number of 
democracies increase world wide, the likelihood of conflicts will decrease. According to 
recent data, over 60 percent of the countries of the world are defined as electoral 
democracies.11 Generally, democracies do not fight democracies. In fact, the probability 
that two democracies will resort to armed conflict is 33 percent less than any other 
possible dyads.12 Supposedly, democracies are less prone to war because, in a 
government “of the people, by the people,” the masses who bear the brunt of the costs for 
fighting are unlikely to support capricious wars.13 Citizens constrain democratic states’ 
actions through their representatives and public opinion. Political opponents also limit the 
states’ behavior because states, sensitive to criticisms, aim to minimize censure by 
making more measured decisions. Consequently, democracies tend to be more peaceful.   
However, democracy can also have adverse ramifications for American military 
interests. In 2003, Turkey’s parliament frustrated American military plans which called 
for a northern advance into Iraq and staging in Turkey of over 200 combat aircraft, as 
many as 100 helicopters, the 3rd Armored Calvary Division, and the 4th Infantry Division 
– one of only two full heavy divisions committed during the war.14 Having won by a 
                                                 
10. Anne Marie Baylouny, “Democratic Inclusion: A Solution to Militancy in Islamist 
Movements? Strategic Insights, vol. 3, no. 4 (Apr. 2004), 
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/apr/baylounyApr04.asp (accessed 20 August 2005).  
11. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, “Introduction,” in The Global Divergence of 
Democracies ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001).  
12. Bruce Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
Inc., 2001), 275.  
13. Ibid.  
14. Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons,  (Westport: 
Praeger, 2003), 153. 
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majority during the 2002 elections, based partly on a platform promising to represent the 
voters’ interests, some members of the Justice and Developmental Party (AKP) – a 
political group characterized as Islamist – was unwilling to disregard its electoral 
promises and its constituents’ anti-war sentiments. According to some opinion polls, 
approximately 90 percent of Turks opposed the Iraq war.15 In March 2003, the Turkish 
Parliament voted against American demands to use Turkey as a staging base for their 
attacks on Iraq.16   
Turkey’s decision had a significant impact on American military planning. United 
States Central Command Commander General Tommy Franks, who was responsible for 
the war’s strategy, stated, “The fact of the matter is that it was quite important, 
strategically and operationally, to have that very heavy force [4th Infantry Division] 
precisely where it was [Turkish bases] until the day it moved [to launch a northern attack 
into Iraq]."17 Consequently, American equipment and weapons, which remained afloat 
along Turkey’s coast, had to be redirected to Kuwait. This example highlights not only 
the importance of democracy for military strategies and foreign policy, but also the 
warning that democracy in the Middle East may not translate into unconditional support 
of American interests. Still, democratic governments seem to be more effective at caring 
for their citizens’ need and less belligerent than available alternatives.  
B. LITERATURE ON PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN THE ARAB WORLD 
Given the U.S. declared interest in promoting democracy in the Middle East, how 
effective can foreign pressure be in causing democratization? The record on external 
pressure causing democracy is mixed. A study of 61 countries that transitioned to 
democratic political systems revealed that only three changed independently – Sweden, 
Great Britain, and Switzerland. The overwhelming majority became democratic 
                                                 
15. “Turkey Politics: The Costs of Ambivalence,” The Economist Intelligence Unit ViewsWire, 2 
April 2003, and Doug Bandow, “Think Tanks Wrap-up VI,” United Press International, 2 April 2003, 
http://www.nexis.com (accessed 18 August 2005). 
16. Peter J. Boyer, “The New War Machine; How General Tommy Franks Joined Donald 
Rumsfeld in the Fight to Transform the Military,” The New Yorker, 30 June 2003, “Political Stability 
Risk,” Economist Intelligence Unit RiskWire, 25 November, 2003, David Edgerly, “Blaming Turkey for Its 
Democracy,” Providence Publications 29 May 2003, http://www.nexis.com (accessed 18 August 2005). 
17. “U.S. Troops Aim to ‘Maintain Initiative,’” Saint Paul Pioneer Press, 31 March 2003, 
http://www.nexis.com (accessed 18 August 2005). 
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subsequent to external pressure or coercion.18 While such studies have bolstered 
American enthusiasm for promoting democracy, the U.S.’s own history at effecting 
democratic transitions is less sanguine. Though it has had some successes such as Chile 
and Nicaragua,19 the U.S. also had failures in Haiti and Albania.20 Some scholars have 
argued that American democracy promotion is not about empowering the people. Citing 
the Philippines in 1985 as an example, they argue that American intervention has not 
aided in institutionalizing democratic reforms, but rather aided the survival of the status 
quo by encouraging regime transformations into polyarchies.21 Regardless, American 
democracy advocacy and the literature of such efforts have focused primarily on 
Southern and Eastern Europe, Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa, largely ignoring 
the Middle East.  
Expressly treating the subject of democracy promotion in the Middle East, the 
authors of Uncharted Journey argue that American efforts have missed their mark. 
Emphasis on promoting civil society, women’s issues, and economic liberation have had 
little success in encouraging states to transition to democratic polities. In fact, states have 
manipulated American programs such as civil societies to advance their national interests. 
The influx of civil societies has been exploited as a means to deflect the population’s 
criticisms and frustrations by keeping them preoccupied with organizational duties. 
Additionally, civil societies have led to the fragmentation of society and frustrated 
attempts to build a broad-based political or social movement to pressure the state. In 
essence, current efforts have strengthened the states’ defenses while providing few 
incentives for democratic change.22   
                                                 
18. John O’Loughlin et al., “The Diffusion of Democracy: 1946-1994,” Annals of the Association 
of American Geographers, vol.88, no.4 (December 1998), 552.  
19. Larry Diamond, “Promoting Democracy,” Foreign Policy, no. 87 (Summer 1992), 39. The  
U.S.’s National Endowment for Democracy is credited to have facilitated the democratic transition of these 
countries. Guillermo O’Donnell et al., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America, (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), and Robert I. Rotberg, Enduring Autocracy Enabling Democracy: 
The Tribulations of Southern Africa 1960-2000, (Cambridge: World Peace Foundation, 2002). 
20. Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve, (Washington, D.C.: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999), 306.  
21. William I. Robinson, “Globalization, the World System, and “Democracy Promotion” in the 
U.S. Foreign Policy,” Theory and Society, vol. 25, no. 5 (October 1996).  
22. Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway, ed. Uncharted Journey: Promoting Democracy in the 
Middle East (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005).  
8 
C. THE STRUGGLE FOR “DEMOCRACY” 
How can we conceptualize the reception of democracy promotion in the Middle 
East? One body of literature helpful in this regard is social movement theory, due to the 
focus on group interactions and the emergence of oppositional movements. Conceptually, 
the dynamics between American democracy promoters and the Middle East resembles 
movement-opposition or counter-movement interactions. Although not strictly a social 
movement, American promotion of democracy has been experienced in the region as a 
movement, one that attempts to persuade through numerous non-governmental 
organizations, media, and public relations declarations. This is not the imposition of 
democracy through overt means, as in colonialism or regime change. Thus, viewed from 
the Middle East, the promotion of democracy appears as a social movement. Yet 
movements clearly are not alone in making demands for political, policy or societal 
changes. Thus, the existence of a movement making demands spurs counter movements 
with alternative interpretations of the issue. Social movement theory with its appreciation 
of framing or contests in the public sphere, and an acknowledgement of movements and 
their counters, is able to decipher the implications of this interaction. Al Jazeera is one 
forum where this dynamic is manifest, facilitating an analysis of the region’s reaction to 
the U.S. promotion of democracy.  
Specifically, opposing movements have emerged to counter America’s framing of 
democracy, which is viewed as inherently American and thus adverse to regional 
interests. “Framing,” is used here to describe the process of explaining or offering an 
interpretative meaning of the word. Oppositional movement competition reflects in the 
frame contests evident in the media. The opposition has tried to discredit (critical 
frames), vilify (anti-U.S. or emotional frames), and neutralize (critical and anti frames) 
America’s effort by offering competing frames of democracy that resonate with the 
people of the region. An example of an anti-U.S. frame is contained in the statement that 
“we believe that democracy is the civilized face of dictatorship. The democracy has 
revealed its face and has become the terrorist democracy: you are either with us or with 
9 
terrorism."23 Still, anti –U.S. frames of democracy have been minimal. The majority of 
the unfavorable frames (critical and anti) expressed have been critical or have questioned 
American credibility in promoting democracy (see Chapter IV).  
Those who are favorable toward democracy and democratic reforms have had to 
qualify their interpretation of democracy and distance themselves from American efforts. 
One guest clarified, "The Arabs should initiate dialogue on the thinking and religious 
rhetoric and syllabuses but this should not be tied to this U.S. campaign. This is because 
any move or attempt would appear as being the result of pressures and in response to U.S. 
pressures."24 Consequently, the emergent frame contests are between “real democracy” 
and “American democracy” frames. “Real democracy” is presented as self-evident and 
not requiring of additional clarification. Whereas, “American democracy” is portrayed as 
not only American in design, but also associated with state collapse, prisoner abuse, 
violence, death and general destruction. The frame contests have reflected prominently 
since 2004. There were also attempts to present other alternatives.  One option called for 
a democracy that reflects Arab cultural and historical sensitivities and is separate from 
American or Israeli interests. Another alternative was political Islam. These alternative 
frames however were secondary to the dominant “real” or “American” frames. The data 
shows consistent support for democracy in the region. Nonetheless, by 2005 a clear 
polarization of the political discourse on democracy developed with favorable and 
unfavorable sentiments reaching near parity.  
Emotions also play a central role in polarizing the political discursive space. By 
framing democracy as inherently American, America unwittingly facilitated opposing 
movement actors’ attacks on its frame. The combination of America’s framing of 
democracy and its attack against Iraq created a powerful incentive for movement 
entrepreneurs to react. In other words, America provided its opponents the “cognitive 
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liberation” they needed to gain legitimacy to respond.25 Specifically, the outbreak of the 
Iraq war in 2003 gave opposing movement entrepreneurs the event necessary to convert 
initial feelings of indignation to long term moral outrage. That is, movement activists 
perceived America’s aggression against Iraq as an opportunity to galvanize and stir the 
peoples’ consciousness using emotion. Within a social movement context, emotions are 
created and reinforced to capture the conscience of the audience. Media images serve to 
add saliency and to strengthen these emotions.26   
In competing to dominate peoples’ consciousness, a frame contest ensues, which 
frustrates and distorts understandings of democracy and creates an implacable schism 
within the political space. Choosing to side with democracy becomes equated with siding 
with America. Aligning oneself with America is analogous to self-hatred and betrayal, 
and is and shunned as an acceptable option. The media present movement and opposing  
movement demands for the people to choose. Given the serious implication of these 
demands, people are compelled to make a decision – in so doing, the divide becomes 
more accentuated.27 In the process of formulating a coherent and divergent understanding 
of democracy from that of America, opposing movement activists denigrated the 
importance of democracy. This leads to, at minimum, confusion and, at maximum, total 
rejection of democracy. Democracy’s definition is broadened to mean everything and 
nothing concomitantly. For instance, democracy has been defined as Israeli repression, 
freedom of opinion, Palestinian rights to political power, respect for individual choice, 
Saudi enforcement of sharia, and reestablishment of Iraqi unity.  
While Middle Eastern states remain the primary agents for political change, media 
pressure has been effective in prompting policy changes when a consensus on issues 
exists.28 However, American promotion has not resulted in helping to form a consensus 
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in support of democracy. On the contrary, American intervention has intensified and 
increased polarization on the issue. Attention that could have been directed against the 
state is diverted to debating the merits of democracy. This diversion has decreased the 
states’ threat perception and need to address reform demands. States have also capitalized 
on the situation. Making conciliatory gestures (i.e. Jordan’s reconstitution of a nominal 
parliament) for American consumption, they secure resources such as financial aid to 
strengthen their security apparatus and coincidentally their survivability.   
D. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Social movement scholars have long noted that “...histories ... reveal powerful 
analogies between the processes driving social movements within national polities and a 
range of other processes, both ‘national’ and ‘international.’”29 Reaction to American 
promotion of democracy is one such process to which social movement theory offers 
valuable insights. As democracy promotion becomes a foreign policy norm, the field may 
consider exploring whether transnational movements composed of states have a greater 
likelihood of success compared to non-governmental transnational movements.30 This 
research is an initial effort to systematically analyze the Arab world’s reaction to the 
American campaign. Greater transnational polling data is needed from the area to bolster 
these findings and larger sample sizes may also prove useful. Nonetheless, this research 
shows that social movement analysis is flexible and parsimonious, well suited to 
examining how populations experience U.S. democracy promotion.   
The implication of this research for policy makers is that greater consideration of 
public diplomacy is necessary. For “... what matters in sending a message is not how you 
would understand it, but how others will understand it.”31 Democracy promotion is a 
commendable goal; however, the close association of the concept with American interests 
complicates efforts. To achieve results, disaggregating democracy from American foreign 
policy may be worthwhile. Otherwise, opposition to democracy may continue as 
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democracy is viewed as an American agenda. This recommendation does not suggest, 
however, that Arabs instantly reject anything that is American to include its promotion of 
democracy or other concepts. The data does not support such a conclusion, and to accept 
this assumption as fact only impedes accurate assessments to formulate sound policies. In 
spite of attacks against fellow Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the 
deteriorating conditions for Palestinians in the occupied territories, the evidence shows 
that until 2004, the region remained optimistic that America would succeed in 
encouraging the states to implement democratic reforms. Additionally, the evidence 
indicates that part of the region’s resistance stems from its lack of trust in the U.S. 
American credibility is badly degraded and actions alone are insufficient to recapture its 
lost political capital from the region. This capital is fundamental to American soft power 
to enhance its “... ability to get what you [it] want[s] through attraction rather than 
coercion or payments.”32 Fortunately, the concept of democracy is widely popular. 
Therefore, through consistent policies, moderated rhetoric, and time, America may serve 
as a positive catalyst in furthering democracy in the Arab world and improve its image 
while pursuing its national interests.  
As the discussion on Turkey’s parliamentary opposition to American demands 
illustrates, political developments can have dire consequences for military operations. In 
support of the political establishment, contingency plans must remain readily available 
and reflect the broad range of political outcomes. Also, military leaders must become 
more adept at understanding the impact of political discourse to minimize sending 
conflicting or counterproductive messages. To understand how messages will be 
interpreted requires greater historical and cultural understanding which suggests 
increased investment in personnel education and training.      
E. CONCLUSION 
America’s overt promotion of democracy has polarized the political discourse in 
the Middle East. This is counterproductive to American national interests because it 
frustrates and distorts understandings of democracy and facilitates states’ maintenance of 
the status quo. The issue of democracy remains relevant and important for American 
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policy makers and military strategists. Due in part to the lack of representative 
democracies in the region and America’s nascent role in its advocacy, literature on the 
impact of American promotion in the region is limited. This thesis aims to help fill the 
void and provide statistical data that shows how the region is reacting. The data indicates 
that a bifurcation within the political space has occurred; this segmentation does not bode 
well for democracy as it undermines the internal pressure which a consensus of popular 
opinion could have exerted. The implications for social movement theory, American 
foreign policy, and the military suggest that additional research on this topic is warranted. 
Still, this thesis offers a preliminary look at some of the developing trends.  
In Chapter II, I provide background information on the key and relevant issues of 
promoting democracy in the Middle East. This chapter helps to place the study’s 
theoretical framework into perspective to better understand why some opposing  
movement formation was inevitable. It begins with a discussion of the difficulty of 
defining democracy and democracy promotion, then provides a historical review of 
America’s role as an advocate of democracy in the region, and ends with highlights of 
current assessments of America’s efforts.    
In Chapter III, I present the thesis’ theoretical framework. I explain how social 
movement theory helps explain group actions and reactions, and discuss the significance 
of frame contests as they pertain to group dynamics. Turning to the data used for this 
study, I review the role of al Jazeera and explore why monitoring and analyzing the views 
on this medium illuminates oppositional trends within the Arab public sphere. I then 
outline the methodology used in this study. 
In Chapter IV, I explain my four main findings. Frames have changed since the 
commencement of American promotion of democracy in the Middle East; a contest of 
frames is evident. Credibility remains a central problem in advancing American interests, 
and these factors combined have led to a polarization of the political space. In light of 
these findings, I explore the implications for states and democratization.  
In the concluding chapter, I summarize my basic argument and address some 
possible criticism of the study. For instance, some could argue that my study is no longer 
applicable because al Jazeera is changing, and so the discourse may also be changing. I 
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address these types of criticisms and reemphasize the lessons which can be gleaned from 























II. BACKGROUND ON DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY 
PROMOTION IN THE ARAB WORLD  
Democracy is a broad topic, the breadth of which cannot and will not be 
addressed in its entirety in this thesis. A basic understanding of the subject and its 
historical relevance to American foreign policy, however, is integral to this study. This 
chapter provides the necessary background information to improve the understanding of 
subsequent research data. In this chapter, I examine the challenge of defining democracy 
and democracy promotion, then provide a brief historical overview of U.S. policy and 
democracy promotion in the region. In conclusion, I assess current American efforts to 
effect democratic policies. 
A. DEFINING DEMOCRACY 
How does the Bush administration define democracy? Following the Saudi 
elections in 2005, President George W. Bush announced that the election served as a 
testament to Saudi Arabia’s progress toward democratic reform.33 Is Bush’s conclusion 
justified? Democracy is a difficult word to define and standardize with static 
characteristics because, with time and experience, it changes. Multiple and varied 
interpretations of democracy exist. Philosopher W.B. Gallie described democracy as one 
of the “essentially contested concepts” for it is “the appraisive political concept par 
excellence.”34  Gallie’s contested concepts include words (for example, art, champion, 
democracy, religion, and social justice) that incite endless disputes without creating 
consensus or resolution. The disputes continue because these words represent complex, 
malleable and important issues that invigorate debates. Parties compete to appropriate 
terms laden with positive affirmations. “I am a democratic state” translates to “I am 
legitimate, I take care of my citizens, and I am fair.”  In other words, what is debated is 
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http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/03/20050329.html (accessed 22 June 2005).   
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not the proper definition of the word, but rather the appropriateness of its application.35 
For instance, is Kuwait a democracy? While Kuwait has had a National Assembly or 
parliament since 1962, its powers are limited, and it represents a small fraction of the 
total population; only Kuwaiti citizens, less than 30 percent of the total population, are 
allowed to vote. In 1981, only three percent of the total population voted in the 
elections.36 The parliament does not balance against the executive body; ultimate 
authority rests with the king. When the National Assembly conflicts with the monarch’s 
interests, it is dissolved and replaced, as occurred in 1976 and 1986.37  
Traditionally, democracy has been defined basically as “government by the 
people, exercised directly or through elected representatives.” This definition emphasizes 
a process, not a particular outcome. Legitimacy and the right to rule come from the 
correct application of the procedure for choosing leaders from this definition. However, 
more than one definition persists.38  David Collier and Steven Levitsky categorized five 
different definitions of democracy. In hierarchical order, these variations are: 1) 
electoralist, 2) procedural minimalist, 3) expanded procedural minimalist, 4) prototopical 
conception of established industrial democracy and 5) maximalist.  In 1942, Harvard 
professor Joseph Shumpeter posited that elections are required for contemporary 
democracies.  Democracies use an electoral process to fill political positions through 
“regular, free [broad suffrage], and fair [minimal fraud] elections among competing 
parties.”39  Beginning in 1978, scholars such as Juan Lintz argued that, in addition to 
elections, democracy needed to ensure basic civil liberties such as freedom of speech, 
assembly, and association. Later, other scholars, including Samuel P. Huntington, 
contended that elections alone are inadequate indicators of democracy. For a state to be 
characterized as democratic, elected officials must have the power to effectively govern.  
                                                 
35. See, Kenneth Smith, “Mutually Contested Concepts and Their Standard General Use,” 
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37. Ibid., 35-41.  
38. American Heritage College Dictionary, (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company: 1993), 369.  
39. Diamond, x.  
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Scholars have used individual case studies to categorize states as democratic with 
caveats. In this classification, Collier and Levitsky record over one hundred subtypes of 
democracies. These subtypes contain relaxation of the various elements of democracy. 
For instance, they labeled Einar Berntzen’s “Democratic Consolidation in Central 
America” as an example of U.S.-imposed democracy where national sovereignty is 
weakened. The final category of maximalist is reflected in Richard Fagen’s writing. 
Maximalist democracies are rare and ideal types. Egalitarianism permeates all aspects of 
the state (social, political and economic) and political participation resembles the 
practices of the Athens model. Collier and Levitsky conclude that their review of the 
various definitions of democracy does not provide any definitive or absolute definitions 
of democracy given that the definition is continuously amended to fit its particular user’s 
need.40         
Defining democracy promotion is equally contentious. William Robinson posits 
that American promotion of democracy is actually promotion of polyarchy. Polyarchy 
involves the masses electing from a select pool of competing elites to rule. The advantage 
of having a polyarchic system is that it facilitates maintenance of the status quo. 
Polyarchy focuses exclusively on the political process (elected officials) and not on 
substance (social and economic inequalities). Robinson charges that American foreign 
policy is based on maintaining the status quo and its elites which requires undermining 
popular forces that may seek democratization.41 In fact, NED proponents Larry Diamond, 
Juan Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset seem to support Robinson’s claim that America’s 
promotion of democracy is synonymous with promoting polyarchy. They write that NED 
is exclusively focused on the political aspect of the government and not in the social or 
economic realms.42 In other words, what is important is not that significant societal 
changes take place or that the people are empowered, but that an increased number of 
elites are included in political contests. This method of inclusion and electoral contests 
serve to mitigate demands for significant change.  
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B. U.S. POLICY AND DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
In 1919, President Woodrow Wilson proposed an electrifying concept. 
Democracy, Wilson suggested, could stave off future wars such as World War I. If more 
countries were formed based on the principles of self-determination, and citizens were 
included in national decision-making, reckless and secretive aggressive foreign policies 
would become impossible. World War I was the consequence of autocratic states 
behaving selfishly. “No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and 
accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the 
governed,” he said.43  The Middle East embraced Wilson’s message: the Wafd from 
Egypt, King Faisal of Syria, and the Kurds all pleaded their case at the Paris Peace 
Conference.44 Wilson dispatched Dr. Henry Churchill King and Charles R. Crane to 
conduct surveys in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine as part of the Peace Conference Inter-
Allied Commission on Mandates in Turkey to determine the people’s preferences. 
Among many of its findings, the King-Crane commission reported that the majority of 
the people favored independence, but if a mandate was mandatory they preferred 
American tutelage.45 America, however, was wary of foreign entanglement and declined 
an active role in the Middle East which it viewed as a British and French sphere of 
influence. In spite of the region’s enthusiasm for Wilson’s message, their preferences 
were discarded.  
Since President Wilson’s advocacy of democracy, American presidents have 
downplayed democracy in favor of real politik concerns. Containment of the “Soviet 
threat” came to dominate American foreign politics and became the lens through which 
events were interpreted. Additionally, the U.S. sought to preserve stability or the status 
quo in the region for ease of access to the region’s oil reserves. In 1947, President Harry 
Truman announced “totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect 
aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of 
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the United States.”46  It therefore “...must be the policy of the United States to support 
free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside 
pressures.”47 The Eisenhower administration shared President Truman’s belief in the 
need to defend democracy and resist communism and totalitarianism. He added: 
Considering her [Soviet] announced purpose of Communizing the world, 
it is easy to understand her hope of dominating the Middle East ... [which] 
contains about two thirds of the presently known oil deposits of the world 
and it normally supplies the petroleum need of many nations of Europe, 
Asia and Africa. The nations of Europe are peculiarly dependent upon this 
supply, and this dependency relates to transportation as well as to 
production ... If the nations of that area should lose their independence, if 
they were dominated by alien forces hostile to freedom, that would be 
both a tragedy for the area and for many other free nations whose 
economic life would be subject to near strangulation.48     
The Eisenhower Doctrine called for the defense of any Middle Eastern state 
threatened by communist forces. Eisenhower feared strangulation not only from 
communists but also Arab nationalists that he considered communist satellites – most 
notably Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser. Following the 1958 Lebanese internal crisis, 
during which President Camille Chamoun invoked the Eisenhower Doctrine to prevent 
his ousting, Eisenhower blamed the incident on Nasser.49 He explained that the Lebanese 
incident showed Nasser’s true intent, which was to control access to the region’s oil 
supplies and to enrich and empower himself at the peril of Western powers.50 To protect 
American interests, it became necessary to support regimes capable of maintaining 
stability in partnership with the U.S., regardless of these regimes’ lack of 
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freedom. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles clarified, “These [authoritarian regimes] 
are not the people we want to support ... [but] we know that we cannot make a transition 
[to democracy] without losing control of the whole situation.”51    
U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East remained unchanged until 1979. While 
maintaining a status quo favorable to U.S. interests had been fundamental, in the wake of 
the Iranian revolution and the capture of fifty-two American diplomats, calls for 
promoting democratic change as a means of ensuring peace returned. President Ronald 
Reagan expressed “... America must actively wage the competition of political ideas – 
between free government and its opponents – and lend our support to those who are 
building the infrastructure of democracy.”52 Though America continued to support 
authoritarian regimes such as Iraq, organizations like the National Endowment for 
Democracy (NED), which was created in 1983, served as an extension of American 
policy to inoculate and promote democracy globally to secure stability. By 1992, NED 
and other U.S.-sponsored democracy promotion entities had democratization programs in 
109 countries, yet less than one percent of American efforts were targeted at Middle 
Eastern regimes.53   
The end of the Cold War era and concomitant collapse of the quintessential 
communist state ushered in the proliferation and dominance of democratic states or “the 
‘third wave’ of democratization,” but this wave left little imprint on the Middle East.54 
According to Freedom House, the number of democratic states worldwide increased from 
76 to 117 between 1990 and 1995.55   During his State of the Union address, President 
George Bush proclaimed, “For more than 40 years, America and its allies held 
communism in check, and ensured that democracy would continue to exist. Today, with 
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communism crumbling, our aim must be to ensure democracy's advance. To take the lead 
in forging peace and freedom's best hope – a great and growing commonwealth of free 
nations.”56 Unlike the other regions of the world, no representative democracy – either 
liberal or electoral – exists in any Arab Middle Eastern state.57 Most remain autocratic.  
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August of 1990 caused America additional 
consternation regarding its Middle East policy and its promotion of democracy in the 
region. During a hearing before the Subcommittee on Middle East Affairs in June of 
1991, U.S. Representative and Chairman Lee Hamilton complained of Kuwaiti aversion 
to implementing democratic reforms after the U.S. had extended its services to help 
restore the ruling family’s sovereignty. While Kuwait should have been grateful and 
receptive to American demands for democratic reforms, it remained obdurate to change.58 
Between 1992 and 1993, scholars such as Larry Diamond, senior research fellow at the 
Hoover Institution; Lisa Anderson, director of Columbia University’s Middle East 
Institute; and Michael Hudson, a Georgetown University professor of international 
relations, briefed the Foreign Affairs Committee of the need to promote democracy in the 
Middle East. Mr. Diamond proposed, “If we are seriously interested in peace and stability 
in the Middle East, we must also begin to think much more seriously about how to 
encourage a long-term process of democratic change there as well.”59       
The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center towers marked another watershed 
in U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Calls for the promotion of democracy in the 
region intensified. In September 2002, President George H.W. Bush released his 
administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS). John Lewis Gaddis, a Yale history 
professor, opined that Bush’s NSS “...could represent the most sweeping shift in U.S. 
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grand strategy since the beginning of the Cold War.”60  Gaddis noted that, unlike 
previous administrations that also included the promotion of democracy in their NSS, 
Bush’s NSS was proactive (the U.S. will defend, preserve, and extend democracy) and 
specific (“free and open societies on every continent”). Also, the President publicly 
criticized friendly Arab states and pondered the logic of American preoccupation in 
defending the region’s stable, but autocratic regimes. In November 2003, President 
George W. Bush warned: “Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating 
the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe ... As long as the 
Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of 
stagnation, resentment, and violence ready for export ... it would be reckless to accept the 
status quo.”61  To oppose terrorism, the U.S. must build “lasting, democratic peace ... by 
supporting the rise of democracy, and the hope and progress that democracy brings, as 
the alternative to hatred and terror in the broader Middle East.”62 
C. CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY PROMOTION 
IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
After September 11, the Bush administration initiated several programs to 
encourage democracy in the region. In June 2002, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell 
launched the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) to promote reform and 
democracy in the Muslim world. Specifically, MEPI is designed to encourage “expanded 
public space where democratic voices can be heard in the political process, the people 
have a choice in governance, and there is respect for the rule of law.”63  Like NED, MEPI 
is restricted to the political realm.  Since its inception, the funding for the initiative has 
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increased from 29 million dollars to 75 million dollars.64  In March 2002, the Middle East 
Radio Network was created.65  Bush announced that the network will ensure that accurate 
information from an American perspective is available to the region to help mitigate 
misunderstandings of American actions and policies.66   
So far, the results have been mixed. In February 2005, Egyptian President Hosni 
Mubarak called for an amendment to article 76 of the constitution to allow for multiple 
candidates and parties to participate in presidential elections. Shortly thereafter, his 
security forces arrested, beat, and intimidated vocal opponents – most notably former 
parliamentary member Ayman Nur.67  In September 2005, President Hosni Mubarak won 
his fifth six-year term with 88.6 percent of the votes in Egypt’s first presidential 
elections. Among the irregularities noted, some registered voters claim that, when they 
reported to the voting booth, their names were not listed and they were turned away.68  In 
Jordan, King Abdallah II has made little progress on reform. Neil Hicks, Director of 
Human Rights First’s Special Initiative on the Middle East, commented that Jordan’s 
embrace of liberal reforms is an illusion; in actuality, Jordan has resisted concrete 
democratic reforms.69 From February to April of 2005, Saudi Arabia held their first 
municipal elections for half of the 178 municipal council positions.70 Women were not 
allowed to participate. In fact, some maintain that Saudi women live in a state of “gender 
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apartheid.”71 On March 11, 2002, in Mecca, 15 girls died in a fire because Saudi Arabia’s 
religious police refused to let the girls leave the burning school without their hijab and 
abaya. Witnesses claimed the police physically prevented the girls from exiting the 
building because they did not have on their abaya.72   
In Uncharted Journey, the authors argue that one of the biggest challenges 
America faces in its promotion of democracy in the Middle East is that it lacks a coherent 
strategy based on realistic assessments of regional circumstances. Following the terrorist 
attacks on the World Trade Center towers, America felt compelled to respond. 
Democracy promotion formed a soft and long term approach to complement its hard or 
military responses in Afghanistan and Iraq. In its haste, it overlooked the nature of the 
challenges for democratization in the region.  
American policy makers approached the Middle East as they had other regions 
including the former communist countries. In fact, the majority of those promoting 
democracy in the region are not Middle East experts and are inclined to over-generalize, 
treating the region as a monolithic entity and making assumptions divorced from regional 
realities.73 For instance, in the former communist region democracy was readily 
embraced because it represented the only viable alternative to the failed ideology of 
communism, and the U.S. voice viewed as credible since it was untainted by any scandal 
of internal meddling. Based on the assumption that democracy is intrinsically universal 
and has mass appeal, these experts expected the Middle East to embrace democracy and 
America’s support as enthusiastically as had the former communist countries. These 
experts failed to appreciate that a more attractive and competing mass ideology to 
democracy – political Islam – exists, in varying degrees, in all Arab states.74  Making 
matters worse, these experts and policy makers have not reached a consensus on a plan of  
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approach. Consequently, American democracy promotion is uncoordinated, 
multipronged, and lacking of a strategic framework. In other words, American democracy 
promotion in the Middle East is in a state of flux.75  
In the interim, policy makers have promoted civil society, women’s rights and 
economic reform as makeshift determinants for democracy. Yet, these measures are 
superficial and do not necessarily lead to democracy. Arab states, adept at ruling by 
divide and conquer, have used foreign promotion of civil society campaigns as extensions 
of their policies and co-opted these organizations. In Egypt, U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) representatives work in partnership with the 
government in deciding which nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) the Egyptian 
government will tolerate to determine which the U.S. should support. The NGOs 
generally supported are those that pose no threat to the state; contribute practical services 
which the state cannot or do not provide (i.e. small loans for women and education); and 
lack the potential for mass mobilization and appeal (i.e. isolated pro-democracy elites). 
The promotion and subsequent proliferation of civil societies have created fragmentation 
which serves the states’ interests. Egypt has an estimated 14,000 NGOs which thwarts the 
formation of concerted and sustained pressure against the state.76   
Similarly, the promotion of women’s rights does not represent a challenge to 
states. Such reforms on gender issues are easily absorbed without changing the nature of 
the state. In fact, incorporating these reforms helps states to create a veneer of political 
liberalization which they can use to improve their international or regional image. 
Regardless, Britain and the United States were democracies long before women were 
given the right to vote and were welcomed into the labor force.77 Encouraging Arab states 
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to increase the number of female representatives in parliaments that lack authority and 
power is more symbolic than real.78   
Neither does economic prosperity appear to be necessary for democratization. 
Most states recognize the need for economic reform and accept certain aspects of 
Western (World Bank or International Monetary Fund (IMF)) recommendations. For 
example, Syria, Iraq and Algeria initiated IMF prescribed stabilization measures, which 
involve fiscal reforms, reduction of government expenditures, and curbing inflation, even 
as they rebuffed American associated financial institutions.79 These states looked to 
Singapore as an example of a country that enjoyed economic success without 
democracy.80 Other IMF and World Bank recommendations are more contentious. For 
instance, privatization and structural adjustment threaten Arab states’ monopoly of the 
economy on which their survival hinges. Using their monopoly on the economy, states 
dole out financial favors to loyal clients, punish opponents, and strengthen their internal 
security organizations to control and to monitor the population. So, while states may 
implement economic reform measures, they are unlikely to willingly commit political 
suicide – reforms that threaten the existent power distribution are discarded or perverted 
(i.e. reserving private companies for tribal members or loyal clients).           
Meanwhile, American democracy advocates have been reluctant to take actions 
that are directly conducive to democracy. American efforts fail to incorporate Islamists, 
to encourage the mass mobilization of political groups, or to challenge the regimes’ 
power structure, all of which are essential for democratization. Islamists, who enjoy 
popular support, are characterized indiscriminately as illiberal threats, terrorist 
sympathizers, or terrorists.81 States keen to stunt the mobilization of any formidable 
opponent capitalize on Western fears and repress these Islamist groups. Yet, Islamists 
may represent the most credible group to organize and mobilize broad-based constituents                                                  
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to pressure the state to change.82 Democratization requires local political organizations 
capable of massing a force willing to engage in sustained engagement against the state, 
for external foreign pressure alone is insufficient to coerce the state to change.83 It is 
internal pressure that compels states to change the existing power distribution. Yet, 
American promotion efforts reflect an aversion to altering the states’ power distribution 
for fear of state collapse. Rather, America prefers a gradualist approach, which entails 
skirting the issue, lauding fig leaf reforms and avoiding direct confrontations with Arab 
states. In the end, these tactics miss the mark and do not lead to democratization but the 
preservation of the status quo.      
D. CONCLUSION 
America’s lack of experience in promoting democracy in the region and the 
difficulty in standardizing the meaning of democracy and democracy promotion are 
factors that America can overcome – that is, these factors, although restrictive, are not 
indicative of inevitable failure. Still, current American promotion of democracy in the 
Middle East has handicaps. A tradition of inconsistent foreign policies has mired its 
credibility and is among the most relevant. The authors of Uncharted Journey cite the 
lack of a coherent strategy as another significant shortcoming. Regardless, the success or 
the failure of America’s efforts is not automatic or predetermined. What is relatively 
certain, however, is that a foreign policy based on promoting democracy inevitably leads 
to debate, given that the term itself is a “contested concept.” These debates are essentially 
frame contests to determine whose interpretation of “democracy” will prevail. The next 
chapter presents the theoretical framework and expands on the concepts of frame contests 
and internal pressure for democratization.    
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III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
As discussed in the previous chapter, internal pressure for democratization is 
crucial. Internal pressure may come in the form of political parties, oppositional groups, 
social movements, or mass protests. I argue that, contrary to a theory equating promotion 
of a policy with reforms in the same direction, advocacy of a policy can have the reverse 
effect, an outcome particularly relevant for Arab states. Specifically, I argue that 
American promotion of democracy in the Middle East is not likely to succeed because 
American efforts have caused opposing movements to emerge, detracting from the 
internal pressure necessary to compel the state to expand the political space. In framing 
democracy as inherently American, a frame contest or a struggle of meaning has 
developed which has polarized discourse on the subject. This result serves neither to 
educate the people about democracy, nor motivate them to act against the state (internal 
pressure), but rather promotes the inadvertent defense of the state and the status quo by 
opposing American demands for change. In other words, the understanding of democracy 
becomes clouded as democracy is distorted. With the state’s threat-perception of the 
internal opposition decreased, domestic policy makers can confidently withstand external 
pressures for substantial changes, compromising instead through cosmetic liberalization 
measures. In the end, the status quo is maintained.  
In this study, I look at the speech expressed on al Jazeera, which is a platform or a 
public sphere for political discussion. When that speech reflects a consensus of opinion, it 
can then serve as a source of internal pressure. Inversely, a lack of consensus over 
democracy may indicate a lack of pressure on the states. The speech reflected on al 
Jazeera is associated with opposing movements, employing competing frames favorable 
or unfavorable to “American democracy.” In this chapter, I present the theoretical 
concepts underlining my argument. I look at opposing movement dynamics, frame 
contests, and the importance of al Jazeera and its role as a communication platform. I 
conclude with the study’s methodology. In the following chapter, I present and analyze 
the findings of my research.    
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A. DYNAMICS OF OPPOSING MOVEMENTS 
Social movement theory is an effective tool to understand Arab reaction to the 
U.S. promotion campaign. To understand this reaction requires an understanding of the 
interplay between the environment, individual motivation, group motivation, resources, 
and actions. In other words, what is needed is a theory that analyzes group reactions 
along the various dimensions that may impact those responses. Social movement theory 
is a multi-dimensional approach that examines these numerous layers in isolation as well 
as through interactions. While American promotion of democracy is not in actuality a 
social movement, it shares the same functions and behaves similarly to a social 
movement. As such, the opposing movement dynamics that ensue are similar to those of 
traditional opposing movements interactions detailed in social movement theory. Thus, 
social movement theory is an appropriate tool to interpret this study’s data. In this 
section, I begin by exploring the basic characteristics, motivations, and functions of 
social movements and opposing movements. I then discuss the dynamics of these dyads, 
followed by an outline of why American efforts are perceived as a social movement. 
Highlighted are some of its characteristics (i.e. resource mobilization structure). Finally, I 
offer evidence of the perception that the U.S. is a social movement by reviewing some 
opposing movements’ initial reactions.   
While social movements around the world may differ in details, they share some 
basic characteristics and motivations. Social movements exist at the national and 
transnational level and are “collective challenges [actions] by people with common 
purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities.”84 
Transnational movements are groups or organizations from more than one country that 
coordinate their actions for a common cause.85 Social movements are rational, strategic, 
and organized endeavors that emerge as a result of structural changes. Structural changes 
or political opportunities are alterations within the operational environment that create 
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openings for collective action by increasing or decreasing individuals’ or groups’ 
expectations of their actions’ efficacy.86 This structure consists of all external dynamics 
outside of the group’s immediate control which they may leverage to their advantage. 
Some examples of the political opportunity structure include changes within the 
international community, weakening of the state or regime, splits within the political 
elite, increase in crime, and economic depression or recession. Essentially, these changes 
present movement entrepreneurs with a political opportunity or motivation for action.  
Social movements also behave similarly – that is, they have the same fundamental 
function, which is primarily to persuade the state. What often differentiates social 
movements, however, are their available means for action or their resource mobilization 
structure. Specifically, social movements seek to coerce, persuade and cajole the public, 
elites, authorities, and external interests to support their efforts.87 To do this, social 
movements first mobilize resources. Movements’ mobilizing structures consist of formal 
and informal institutions through which groups associate, socialize, organize, and partake 
in collective actions. Mobilization is facilitated when an adversarial force or movement is 
perceived to be reaching its goals, a highly centralized organizational structure exists, and 
a “singular target of conflict” – such as war - galvanizes the population.88 Social 
movements are not formed ad hoc or spontaneously. Movements utilize existing societal 
structures to recruit members and resources for collective actions. Existing institutions 
such as the media, mosques, social clubs, and personal networks form the nexus of 
mobilizing resources.   
Movements in an issue field or counter movements share similar characteristics, 
motivations and functions. Just as social movements do not arise in a vacuum; neither 
does the movement field remain uncontested. Politically significant social movements 
spawn favorable conditions for opposing movement formation.89 Counter movements 
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resemble their opponents and may have common concerns, but these groups of 
individuals and organizations compete to influence the state, mass media, and the public 
to implement their championed policy or political changes.90  Mass media coverage may 
encourage the development of opposing movements because journalists try to capture 
alternative sentiments to movement claims.91   
Thus, movements and opposing movements do not function in separate fields, but 
rather interact; the resulting interaction has distinct characteristics. Essentially, 
movements create the conditions ripe for opposing movement formation by advocating 
societal changes that attack the interests of some and raise their costs, while benefiting 
others. Consequently, the changes advocated by movements lead to new grievances 
which opposing movement entrepreneurs use to define their own goals and positions. 
Movements have a demonstrative effect and embolden rival movement formation to 
compete for priority and influence society along their own favored lines. Movement and 
opposing movement interaction affect both parties since their interaction alters the 
operational environment or the political opportunity structure. Movement and counter 
movements use each other as visible signs of threat to mobilize supporters and keep their 
agenda relevant and invigorated.92 Regardless, this does not mean that opposing 
movements can form only once a movement emerges. Opposing movements can emerge 
at any time to advocate for a particular interest upon perception that a window of 
opportunity has opened. Importantly, as actors from both movements focus on reacting to 
their opponents, the ensuing dynamic can inadvertently lead to a defense of the status quo 
rather than making new demands of the state.93 In the U.S. movement-opposing 
movement dynamics have been observed over issues such as abortion, women’s rights, 
gay rights, and gun control. In the Middle East, this dynamic has been observed between 
the Egyptian government and the Muslim Brotherhood and between Hamas and the 
Palestinian Authority.  
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The U.S.’s promotion efforts are perceived as a social movement with noticeable 
features. In other words, the Middle East experiences American actions in the region as 
part of a social movement to fundamentally change their society. While American 
democracy promotion is not, strictly speaking, a social movement, the effect of the U.S. 
democracy campaign and the response to it parallel the interactions of movements within 
an issue field. Clearly, American democracy promotion is fundamentally different from 
social movements such as Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, or the Civil Rights 
movement of the 1960s. While these movements emerged from domestic non-state 
sources, “American democracy” is international and the product of the U.S. government. 
To the region, America’s actions and rhetoric are consistent with those of a social 
movement, for it seeks to fundamentally transform the societal and political fabric of the 
states through indirect persuasion and public relations.94 President Bush has reiterated 
that the U.S. is engaged in a campaign against the Middle East on numerous occasions. 
He has warned that the Middle East needs to reform  or become a main supplier of 
international violence and terrorism.95 The President continues to reiterate America’s 
commitment to wage a “broad and sustained campaign” to enhance American security 
and destroy terrorism.96 From Middle Easterners’ perspective, America, armed with 
financial and mobilizational resources superior to the states in the region themselves, 
represents a strong movement geared toward altering the cultural and the historical 
makeup of society. Alternatively, America is advocating an idea that permeates all facets 
of the society – social, political, economic. Yet, democracy is equivocal, and through the 
eyes of the objects of this advocacy, America is depriving Arabs of their right to freely 
define for themselves what democracy means. As an Egyptian politician expressed, “We 
accept 99% of the framework of democracy and you keep pushing us to accept the bad 
1%! Americans are promoting homosexuality, free sex, things which go to the very roots 
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of human society and are not even accepted by everyone in America. And they want us to 
start with it.”97 
The American ability to engage in this campaign is well resourced. For instance, 
America has considerable influence on international organizations such as the United 
Nations, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Bank that already advocate 
democracy, whether directly or implicitly through their charter. America also has 
international agencies like the Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO); 
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL); and U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID)  whose explicit missions are to advance American foreign policy. 
Additionally, America has access to networks of Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGO) – the most prominent of which are the National Endowment for Democracy (and 
its subordinate organizations) and Freedom House. Middle Eastern NGOs can also be 
exploited. For example, in 2002, the American embassy in Cairo provided six Egyptian 
NGOs a million dollars to support pro-democracy related activities.98 President Bush can 
also employ his diplomatic networks to tap into ally resources, but as the sole super-
power and with a Gross National Product (GNP) of almost eleven trillion USD – the 
largest in the world – whatever is not readily available can be purchased.99 The media is 
also a key resource that President Bush uses to advance his administration’s democracy 
promotion. Unlike regular movement actors, the President of the United States is 
guaranteed media coverage whenever he speaks.100 As a public relations measure, the 
Bush administration launched the Middle East Radio Network or al Hura to broadcast 
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American points of view.101 These are just some of the organizations and resources at the 
disposal of the U.S. to persuade Arab states to alter their domestic policies. 
As would be expected, given traditional counter movement dynamics, American 
democracy promotion has spurred oppositional reactions, since the U.S. campaign to 
influence and set priorities conflicts directly with national efforts to influence Arabs’ own 
states. Instead of domestically-generated pressures for change, the U.S. is externally 
attempting to effect internal changes within sovereign polities through its public 
campaign. In other words, American demands are competing with indigenous groups’ 
own perceived legitimate right to demand changes from the state, undermining local 
movements’ prerogative to set their agenda. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Jordan may place changes in education or social affairs as more important than liberal 
democracy, but find that they now must compete with American demands for priority to 
influence the state to implement these preferences. Eventually, indigenous groups shift 
their attention from making demands of the state to countering American pressure – this 
inadvertent result leads to the defense of the status quo. 
Additionally, opposing movements have responded to American pressure by 
reassessing their identities to facilitate future mobilization. President Bush’s speeches are 
viewed as unjustly targeting the region. Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia 
declared that the Muslim world is treated with disrespect and not as equals among the 
states of the international system, but rather as children in need of supervision and 
reprimand. To add insult to this mistreatment, Muslims are blanketed as terrorists and 
enemies, he stated.102 This sense has caused Middle Easterners to defensively reassess 
their identity as well as re-evaluate “the other,” the U.S. An Egyptian politician 
explained, “You want me to be exactly like you. If I try to do this, I will end up a 
disfigured human being. I won’t know how to be like you and remain myself. You are 
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Western, you have your own culture, your own history. I am Middle Eastern. I don’t ask 
you to become Egyptian.”103 This examination is occurring through discourse because, 
through communication, identities, which are relational, are created, reinforced, or 
amended. In other words, verbal communication is subject to the audience’s 
interpretation, which is bound by the interpreter’s sense of identity, norms, and context. 
Eventually, particular views become established and characteristic of an identity. For 
instance, the head of the Arab American Institute, James Zogby, concluded through his 
interviews that the Middle East’s opposition to the U.S. "...defines almost existentially 
their sense of who they are."104 The counter movement approach can explain this 
development. Established identities become reference points to judge actions and gauge 
acceptable behavior. Once opposing movement actors are prepared to build on their sense 
of identity to influence others, they engage in strategic framing.  
B. FRAME CONTESTS 
The concept of frame contests is an integral aspect of social movement theory.  
While the previous section helped explain individual and group motivation for action or 
reaction, the concept of frame contests explains the preliminary act that precedes concrete 
collective action. Put differently, frame contests are actions taken to mobilize individuals, 
groups, etc. to think and act collectively. Collective action can conceptually be viewed as 
a continuum of movement activities with identity assessment at one end of the spectrum 
and public demonstrations or protests at the other extreme. Frame contests fall in the 
middle of this continuum. In this section, I first define the basic characteristics of frames , 
then explain the purpose of frames, followed by exploring why certain frames work or 
resonate with audiences while others do not, and close with a discussion on why frame 
contests occur. 
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The word “frame” is a rather common term, but in social movement theory is has 
a set definition and characteristics. Frames are “schemata of interpretation.”105 It is the 
interpretive formula of an event and explains the key elements of what is going on, who 
bears responsibility and what should be done.106 Framing is the process movement 
entrepreneurs use to develop frames or produce meanings.107 These meanings are social 
by-products of interactions, which sometimes are confrontational and other times not, 
between various actors engaged in its production. Thus, framing is interactive and 
responds to internal and external cues to produce an understanding of reality – frame. 
Framing is a cognitive, active and conscious process that involves calculating what 
means is available to achieve a predetermined end. Emotions play a role as movement 
activists strategically seeks to pinpoint and accentuate the most emotive interpretations 
that lead people to react either through action or antipathy towards their opponents. 
Movement entrepreneurs use frames to target a broad range of different types of 
audiences such as the media, the public, state elites, etc. for effect.  
Clearly, frames serve multiple purposes. Opposing movements compete using 
frames, which enable movement actors to distinguish themselves from competing groups 
and to advertise their position or particular world views. Still, in the absence of a 
common frame or understanding, collective action is unlikely, since frames provide 
individuals and groups the common vector needed to perform as a unit.108 Frames 
reinforce group cohesion and improve expectations of success. In other words, frames 
can create opportunities for action. Frames create this opportunity by employing emotive, 
cultural, or historical symbols that incite strong emotional reactions and demands for 
action.109 Movement actors try to formulate their frames in such a way that a reasonable 
person cannot simply dismiss their demands as an ephemeral nuisance. For instance, in 
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1992, Saudi religious scholars presented a statement to the King, using an Islamist frame, 
which criticized the regime and its policies. Unlike previous reform movements using 
alternate frames, the Saudi regime, which bases its legitimacy on religion, could not 
counter or ignore an Islamist frame. Using this frame, Saudi Islamist movements created 
an opportunity and liberalized the political space for Saudis to discuss politics and 
religion. Scholars have commented that only an Islamist frame could have extracted such 
concessions from the Saudi regime.110 
Not all frames work; frames that influence behavior do so because they resonate 
with the targeted audience. Movement entrepreneurs seek to produce collective action 
frames that resonate. Collective action frames are interpretations of an event in such a 
way that certain aspects are accentuated and elevated to justify the need for action. To 
justify action, movement entrepreneurs highlight why the event is different from other 
similar events; why the event warrants an escalation of concern; and why the event is an 
issue of justice and not simply one of unfortunate circumstances.111 So, in order for these 
frames to resonate, they must foster a harmonious understanding or interpretation of 
events.112 Because multiple individual interpretations and beliefs coexist, consensus on 
shared meanings is improbable and tenuous. Still, complementary understanding is the 
minimum requirement. This minimum requirement is likely if frames are perceived as 
credible and salient – that is, frame success or resonance is determined by its credibility 
and salience.113        
Credibility is crucial for social movements and their associated frames. 
Credibility is gained through consistency between articulated frames and actions. Had the 
                                                 
110. Gwenn Okruhlik, “Making Conversation Permissible: Islamism and Reform in Saudi 
Arabia,” in Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 261.  
111. Robert Benford and David A. Snow, “Master Frames and Cycles of Protest,” in Frontiers in 
Social Movement Theory, ed. Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1992), 137.  
112. Rhys H. Williams and Timothy J. Kubal, “Movement and Frames and the Cultural 
Environment: Resonance, Failure, and the Boundaries of the Legitimate,” Research in Social Movements, 
Conflicts and Change, vol. 21, 229.   
113. Robert D. Benford and David Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An 
Overview and Assessment,” Annual Review of Sociology, 2000, vol. 26, 619-622. The next paragraphs on 
credibility and salience are based on the subcategories outlined in Benford and Snow’s overview. 
39 
American civil rights movement resorted to violent means to achieve its objective, it 
would have lost credibility through the undermining of its non-violent frame, which 
resonated powerfully. Empirical evidence is another important aspect. Movement 
activists must suggest evidence in support of their frames that are not necessarily 
conclusive or factual, but are plausible to some segment of society. For instance, 
irrespective of evidence, some Australian Muslims believe that the U.S. staged and 
orchestrated the September 11 attacks so that Americans could have “a license to go into 
Islamic countries.”114 Although this perspective is flawed, in light of increased American 
presence and engagement in the Middle East, to some it is conceivable. Social movement 
articulators are also central for strengthening groups’ credibility. Articulators who have 
expertise or are considered authorities in fields are sought to bolster the social 
movement’s credibility. Anti-Vietnam War activists actively sought war veterans to 
condemn the fighting and serve as movement spokespersons.115 The underlying 
assumption being that war veterans are the best qualified to judge the utility or morality 
of war and thereby qualify as authority figures.  Additionally, a war veteran can hardly be 
accused of being unpatriotic for opposing a war; this makes it more difficult for 
opponents to use un-American frames to counter and vilify movements backed by these 
spokespersons.   
Like credibility, salience is fundamental for frame resonance. Salience is achieved 
by ensuring that frames are central to the targeted audiences. Frames must be relevant to 
the individuals’ lives. Frames that do not show how problems or situations impact the 
individuals’ beliefs, values, or ideas will likely be ignored. For instance, Sierra Club 
(environmental group) activists trying to recruit inner city dwellers will likely face 
difficulties. Likewise, movement activists’ frames must be grounded in reality. Following 
Iraq’s invasion and expulsion from Kuwait, there were campaigns to pressure the Kuwaiti 
government to implement democratic reforms such as recognizing women’s rights. These 
campaigns, however, were ill timed and ignored the ground truth. A Kuwaiti asked, 
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“How can you ask me to spend my time talking about women driving ... when last week 
my daughter was raped by the Iraqis?”116 Lastly, narrative fidelity or cultural resonance 
indicates the tailoring of messages and perspectives to fit the targeted audience’s cultural 
sensitivities, minimizing counterproductive expressions and increasing salience.117   
Frame contests occur because of the marketplace of ideas.  In this market, 
multiple interpretations of reality exist and all frames, no matter how resonant, are 
susceptible to debate or may spur frame contests. Frame contests are competitive 
struggles between movement activists and their opponents for frame supremacy. These 
opponents may be opposing movements that developed specifically to challenge the 
movement; bystanders who disagree with the current frame; and or the media. These 
opponents attack the movement’s frame to undercut its reasoning and conclusions.118 
Competition over meaning occurs in the presence of alternate frames; movement actors 
cannot simply impose their own frames on others. Individuals are capable of independent 
reasoning and do not have to embrace the frames presented. In light of this fact, 
movements make adjustments following attacks of their frame and attempt to strengthen 
their frames while weakening those of their opponents.  
C. AL JAZEERA: ITS IMPORTANCE AND ROLE AS A PUBLIC SPHERE 
As mentioned in the first section, American policy makers have made 
considerable investments in media resources to persuade Middle Eastern states and 
people to change. The media is one of the U.S. government’s primary resource 
mobilization tools to effect democratic change in the Arab world. Specifically, American 
emphasis on the use of satellite television stations (al Hura) to broadcast its messages set 
the stage for opposing movement dynamics within this field (satellite television). 
Consequently, to observe how the region is reacting to American demands, I focused on 
analyzing the discussions reflected on al Jazeera satellite television station because it is a 
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site where opposing movement dynamics are evident. In this section, I first discuss the 
importance of the media for social movements; then move to the role of the media as a 
public sphere; followed by the role of the pubic sphere as a source of internal pressure; 
and then to how the media creates pressure by looking at agenda-setting effects. After, I 
defend my choice of al Jazeera by providing background information on the station, and 
end by responding to possible criticisms of using al Jazeera as a platform to observe Arab 
reactions.    
For social movement activists, the media is an important scaffold for frame 
contests. The media is where movement entrepreneurs, various interest groups, 
individuals, etc. present and defend their world views in the hope of swaying the public 
and the state.119 Though there are other social institutions that impact popular opinion and 
discussions, such as mosques, movement activists try to access and use the media 
because it is a communication institution with broad reach. Television, in particular, has 
revolutionized movement tactics.120 Social movements use television coverage as a force 
multiplier and enabler – that is, television helps activists educate, recruit, and mobilize on 
a grand scale.121 Satellite television has expanded the media’s range as well as broadened 
social movements’ reach further. 
Theoretically, the media’s role is that of a public sphere. Jurgen Habermas posited 
that in its ideal, the media is an important communicative element of the public sphere, a 
platform for different expressions and political debates. As societies modernized and their 
populations expanded demographically and territorially, the media became a key 
institution to facilitate communication across geographically separated public spheres. A 
public sphere is a space where political and rational debates or discussions on issues of 
collective concern take place independent of the state – it serves to mediate between civil 
society and state.122 Given the media’s significance, Habermas identified the ideal media 
model as apolitical, impartial and independent of the state. The media is the “fourth 
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branch” and serves as guardian of democracy through its checks and counterbalance of 
the other three branches and representation of the people. In Habermas’ view, “…the 
mass media ought to understand themselves as the mandatary of an enlightened public … 
like the judiciary, they ought to preserve their independence from political and social 
pressure.”123   
Though Habermas’ comments pertained specifically to democracies, they are also 
applicable for authoritarian states. Marc Lynch extended Habermas’ concept to include 
the Middle East. The emergence of satellite television technology has facilitated the 
creation of transnational communication platforms or alternate public spheres which are 
beyond the states’ control. While al Jazeera is far from Habermas’ ideal media, it offers 
its viewers and participants a space for debates and discussions on topics of collective 
concern such as high unemployment, repressive regimes, and need for reform. The views 
expressed on al Jazeera may not necessarily represent the people or the “Arab street’s” 
opinions, but the discourse has been accepted as the de facto Arab voice in the absence of 
alternatives. As such, this study analyzes the different expressions reflected on al Jazeera.  
Theoretically, the media or pubic sphere can serve as a source of internal pressure 
against the states to entice them to change and even democratize. Kai Hafez suggests that 
due to the lack of political parties and familiarity with democracy in the Middle East, al 
Jazeera could serve as an avant-garde for democracy or an intermediary between society 
and the state. Hafez argues that conventional democratic transformation theory does not 
adequately address the nature of transnational satellite television in the Arab world. 
Traditional democratic transformation theory focused on government controlled, 
domestic-based media, where mass media is considered important but not an avant-garde 
to democratization. Transnational satellite television stations have altered the equation – 
these stations are not nation-based and some, like al Jazeera, are independent of state 
control. Al Jazeera has served as a mouthpiece or a platform for public expression against 
the states. Consequently, it has served as a mediator between the Arab societies and the 
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states, a role that was previously reserved for political groups or movements in the 
democratization process.124     
Lynch showed that the discourse reflected on satellite television can transcend the 
rhetorical and lead to action when popular consensus exists. This consensus serves as the 
internal pressure customarily associated with group activities. The public, states and 
social activists monitor al Jazeera as a feedback mechanism, and in so doing eventually 
adjust their behavior to conform to the norms reflected on the television in order to avoid 
perceived or presumed costs. For instance, continuous Arab media coverage of Iraqi 
citizens’ desperate plight in the late 1990s placed the issue on the agenda and confined 
states’ policy options. These discourses mattered because they altered people’s 
perception of what was acceptable, and in time this perception altered their behavior. 
This transformation or internalization of the discourse occurred not only at the individual 
level, but also at the state level. 
For states, behavioral adjustments began with adopting the rhetoric of the 
consensus for strategic interests, then evolves to internalizing that rhetoric through 
consistent use, and finally to aligning rhetoric with actions.125 The consensus set the 
parameter of acceptable or tolerable behavior as well as delineated the retributions for 
aberrations.126 Unwittingly, states adopting the language of the popular consensus 
facilitated the consolidation of that rhetoric by reinforcing its perpetuation which limited 
their political options.127 In the end, while states in the Middle East lack the institutional 
structure for society to hold states accountable, satellite television stations have served as 
an effective intermediary or public sphere to indirectly influence states’ behavior. Backed 
by a consensus of popular opinion, civil societies in Jordan, Syria and Egypt mobilized 
and conducted rallies, protests or pencil collection drives in support of Iraqi civilians. In 
2000, Arab states disregarded the United Nations ban on civilian flights to Baghdad and 
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began making regular deliveries of humanitarian aid to Iraq. By 2002, civilian flights to 
Baghdad became the norm.  
The media serves as a source of internal pressure because of its agenda-setting 
effects. As Lynch’s example showed, fundamental to the media’s ability to exert internal 
pressure is its ability to place an issue on the agenda for discussion. Shanto Inyengar 
studied the agenda-setting effects of television coverage on the American public. He 
found that there is a positive correlation between the amount of television coverage 
dedicated to a particular issue and the prioritization level viewers’ attached to that issue 
as a national concern. Alternatively, the more attention television dedicated to an issue; 
the more the issue became a concern for viewers.128 Through its coverage, television has 
the ability to influence the agenda of priorities in the nation. Exposure to a single news 
story impacted viewers’ priorities. Those who are politically less experienced or inclined 
are more vulnerable to television’s influences because they are less critical and less 
resistant to the news. Lacking the intellectual resources to scrutinize the information 
presented in the news, these individuals find the information more compelling and allow 
it to shape their judgments.  
With 24-hour television broadcasts available, agenda-setting is a continuous 
process. Television coverage on a specific topic impacted viewers’ perspective on that 
specific topic and not necessarily associated topics (i.e. increase drug abuse and possible 
association with level of domestic battery cases). Agenda-setting effects were 
inconclusive only on issues that the viewers already regarded as highly important. These 
effects are not momentary or permanent; they persist until new information alters that 
perspective and induces a reprioritization. The networks develop and change priorities 
and these patterns impact viewers’ preferences. Iyengar examined the causal relation 
between television and public opinion and found strong support that television does 
influence public opinion. For instance, he found that a few media stories per month could 
affect public attention on a subject.129   
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In light of this theoretical discussion on the media and its potential, I selected to 
analyze the discourse reflected on al Jazeera because of the station’s popularity and 
influence. With the motto “al-ra’i ... wal-ra’i al-akhr” – the opinion and the other 
opinion – al Jazeera has become an important platform for political debates and social 
movement activities. Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani formed al Jazeera by 
decree in 1996 as an independent, all news and Arab station based in Qatar.130 By 1999, 
al Jazeera’s popularity soared. Al Jazeera’s appeal was due to its independence, and the 
fact that it is an Arab station covering issues of Arab concern from an Arab perspective. 
The controversy of its topics (i.e. criticisms of Arab rulers) served as constant reminders 
of its independence. Some credited al Jazeera with loosening the shackles of censorship 
and widening the sphere of acceptable public discourse in the Arab world.131 Supported 
by fifty foreign correspondents in thirty-one countries to include Israel, the United States, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq, al Jazeera exposed the Muslim world to a greater variety of 
information.132 It features Muslim and Western guests, and has interviewed Donald 
Rumsfeld, Colin Powell, and Condoleeza Rice. Additionally, al Jazeera broadcasts all 
White House, Pentagon, and State Department press briefings.133 Gaining exclusive 
access to the Taliban, Osama bin Laden, and Saddam Hussein during times of conflict, al 
Jazeera’s notoriety and prestige rose regionally and internationally. What began as a six 
hours a day operation grew to a twenty-four hour daily news broadcast station by 1999.    
An estimated 35 to 45 million households in the Muslim world with an additional 
estimated 4.5 million in the United States and Europe watch al Jazeera.134  In a 2004 
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survey of the region, Zogby International found that most satellite viewers watched al 
Jazeera for international news  62 percent in Jordan, 54 per cent in Morocco, 46 percent 
in the United Arab Emirates, and 44 percent in Saudi Arabia and Lebanon.135 More 
recently, a survey conducted in Cairo, Egypt in 2005 found that 88 percent of satellite 
television viewers watched al Jazeera.136 Zogby also found that 38.9 percent of those 
surveyed learned about the U.S. by watching Arab media. In Saudi Arabia, 68 percent 
said they learned about the U.S. by watching Arab commentaries in the Arab media.137 In 
1998, a survey conducted in Egypt found that the number one reason people watched 
satellite television is “to understand what’s going on in the world.” This gives stations 
like al Jazeera considerable leverage to influence public understanding and opinion.138 
Regional states and American policy makers monitor the station regularly.139 In fact, this 
thesis uses information on al Jazeera derived from the U.S. government’s primary foreign 
media monitoring agency, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). American 
and regional attention accorded to al Jazeera provides it with considerable influence to 
shape not only popular opinion but also to impact regional states’ and American 
government’s perceptions, which may influence their political options. 
Possible criticisms of using al Jazeera include the station’s political agenda and its 
biased perspectives. I will not address whether or not al Jazeera has a political agenda or 
attempt to identify the particulars of that agenda because that issue is a separate concern 
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that is not the focus of this thesis. I do propose, however, that al Jazeera has promoted 
discussions of the democracy topic. For example on the show “The Opposite Direction” 
in March 2005 the topic of discussion was democratic changes in the Arab world;140  in 
November 2004 the topic was U.S. presidential elections and U.S. democracy;141 and in 
December 2004, the station interviewed an Egyptian human rights activist on promoting 
democracy in the Arab world.142  The use of the word democracy has increasingly 
become part of al Jazeera’s vernacular. A review of FBIS’s records on al Jazeera Satellite 
Television Channel reveals that the use of the word democracy reflected in 2.3 percent of 
its records on the station in 2001, and this percentage increased to 6.9 percent by 
September 2005.143    
While al Jazeera has biases, these have a negligible impact on this thesis. Scholars 
have found that, in spite of its biases, al Jazeera provides comparable coverage to 
Western stations like the Cable News Network (CNN).144  When al Jazeera’s coverage is 
compared with other regional television stations such as the Syrian Satellite Channel 
(SSC) and Abu Dhabi Satellite Television (ADSC), the differences in their attitudes on 
news topics such as the U.S. are insignificant. For example, al Jazeera’s coverage of the 
U.S. had a negativity rating of 7.1 percent; ADSC and SSC have negativity ratings of 7.2 
and 6.8 percent respectively.145 In other words, Arab television stations generally reflect 
more critical attitudes toward the U.S., so al Jazeera is not unique or exceptional in its 
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anti-American stance. Of note, according to a Zogby poll of the region in 2004, on 
average 83.3 percent of Arabs expressed unfavorable views of America.146            
D. METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY 
Given television news coverage’s influence, I explore how movement actors are 
debating or commenting on America and democracy on al Jazeera Satellite Television. I 
use FBIS records of al Jazeera that contain the words “democracy” and “America” or its 
derivatives (U.S., Bush, etc.) because I am interested in analyzing how the region is 
reacting to American promotion of democracy in particular.147 I am looking to see if 
opposing movement dynamics are evident as a consequence of American promotion. Is a 
frame contest developing? Has the political discourse become polarized or is there a 
consensus of opinion? My assumption is that when al Jazeera records contain the word 
“America” and “democracy” – even when the discussions are not necessarily addressing 
American promotion of democracy specifically – individual biases towards America’s 
effort will reflect in the connotations guests associate with democracy when America is 
mentioned in the same show or discourse. I am interested in cataloguing what messages 
are being conveyed to the audience. I focus on recording the connotations attached to the 
word “democracy” because these connotations reinforce particular frames such as 
“American democracy is not real,” etc. Conceptually, these competing frames are 
associated with feuding movements. Because of television’s agenda-setting effects, I 
deduced that the frequency with which democracy is portrayed, positively or negatively, 
matters and helps to shape individual understanding of America’s democratization policy. 
I looked at 576 FBIS records on al Jazeera during the timeframe of 1 January 
1998 to 1 September 2005. The reports are analyzed to record the connotation attached to 
the word “democracy” when it is expressed (see Figure 1). Each articulation of the word 
“democracy” represents a data point and is registered – a total of 1,373 utterances were 
recorded. One record may contain one or multiple references to democracy or data points. 
The articulations are characterized as pro-democracy, critical of American democracy, 
anti-American democracy (emotional), and neutral (see Figure 2). Each category of 
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frames is compared and graphed to observe developing trends. Unfavorable frames to 
American interests (critical and anti categories) have been disaggregated to capture the 
nuances of negative opinions expressed as well as isolate emotional tendencies. To 
explore the polarization of the political sphere, the percentage of total favorable and 
unfavorable frames are compared.  
E. CONCLUSION  
While scholars, proponents, and opponents continue to debate its impact on the 
region, they generally agree that al Jazeera is a dominant force that cannot be ignored.148 
Al Jazeera’s role as a transnational public sphere is also important. The discourses 
reflected in its broadcasts provide insight not only into what the Arab world views as 
important but also into how the region is responding to American policies. In using a 
method to quantify the volume and variety of this discourse on democracy and America, 
patterns become distinguishable. The outlined method and the aforementioned theoretical 
perspectives provide the basis for dissecting patterns to determine whether opposing 
movement dynamics, frame contests, and polarization of the political discourse are 
evident and discuss their implications. In the next chapter, I present the findings.      
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In this chapter, I present the findings to answer the aims outlined in Chapter I. To 
reiterate, this study’s aims are to discover whether Middle Easterners’ frames have 
changed subsequent to American democracy promotion; to explore whether a frame 
contest is evident and evaluate the consequence of such a contest; and to discuss the 
impact of those consequences for states. The evidence presented does show that change 
to framing of democracy has occurred in the region.  A frame contest is occurring and has 
resulted in a polarized political discourse. The evidence also shows that credibility 
remains a central factor. The chapter is organized into five sections. Each section 
explores the study’s findings in greater detail. The first section looks at changes in 
frames. The second focuses on the evidence of a frame contest. The third discusses the 
role of credibility as seen in the data. The fourth examines the evidence of polarization. 
The last section discusses the implication of polarization of the political space for 
democratization. Tables and a graph of the data are provided after the conclusion. 
Additional graphs and table are also available in the appendix.  
A. CHANGES TO DEMOCRACY FRAMES FOLLOWING OVERT 
AMERICAN PROMOTION  
In looking at the data, I found that prior to overt American promotion of 
democracy in 2002, guests on al Jazeera generally used the word democracy favorably 
and without caveats (i.e. true, real, etc.). Despite anger, intense and increasing, 
democracy was still well received; favorable expressions reflected supportive attitudes 
toward the concept of democracy that was not associated with America. The opposite 
result obtained after the U.S. campaign associated democracy with the U.S. indicates that, 
had democracy been associated with America during this initial time period, there is a 
good probability that more unfavorable expressions would have been evident.  
From 1998 to 2002, several key incidents affected the Arab world and would 
undoubtedly have reflected in Arab articulations of democracy if democracy had been 
perceived as being synonymous with supporting an American agenda. Considerable 
anger in the Middle East was aimed at Israel and America during this time period. In a 
54 
Zogby poll of the region taken in 2002, on average 73.6 percent of the participants 
expressed unfavorable views of America.149 Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount on 
28 September 2000 sparked the beginning of the second intifada. The killing of 12-year-
old Mohammed al-Durra by Israeli fire as his father held him in his arms became an 
iconic figure and heightened the Arab world’s distaste of Israel and, by extension, 
America. Shortly after the al-Durra killing, top Arab recording artists released the song 
“Jerusalem Will Return to Us” in which the boy’s name is featured prominently; this 
song galvanized the region.150 Anger against America was also due to its direct actions, 
such as the attack on Afghanistan. Another was President George W. Bush’s 
unconditional support for Prime Minister Sharon and calling him a “man of peace” even 
as Israeli forces were engaged in a bloody reoccupation of the West Bank in 2002.151   
Needless to say, the Arab world’s ire towards America was intense. In spite of the 
anger, democracy was often expressed as a cherished good reserved for worthy people. It 
was also a tool to combat the region’s problems. A guest argued that “... had there been 
democracy in Iraq, the invasion of Kuwait would not have taken place.”152  Becoming 
more democratic was seen as a way to escape the crisis that was weakening Arab dignity 
and justice.153  Democracy was an ideal sought for its own sake, independent of foreign 
promotion.    
Evolution of the democracy frame occurred in three phases. First, from 2002 to 
2003, likely due to the high expectations of American success in implanting liberal 
reforms, democracy was viewed favorably and as an independent ideal. Second, from the 
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end of 2003 to 2004, democracy and America began to be closely associated, and the 
discourse became increasingly unfavorable as disillusionment with American progress 
began to crystallize. Third, in 2004, democracy and America became conflated – 
democracy transformed from a cherished ideal to a corrupted American design.   
Since the launching of America’s democracy promotion program in 2002, 
favorable frames continued their upward trend until 2004 (see Table 2 for annual trends). 
Favorable frames increased by close to 10 percent from 2002 to 2003. In 2003, expressed 
favorable frames for democracy reached its zenith at 46.4 percent, and unfavorable 
articulations were at their nadir at 34.6 percent.154 These trends are surprising in light of 
the attack against Iraq.  Just three years earlier, the region united in support of Iraq and in 
defiance of UN sanctions against the country.155 Although Saddam Hussein was not a 
popular figure, the American attack and the goal of regime change had far reaching 
implications that transcended Hussein. One would have expected unfavorable reactions to 
dominate, but the opposite dynamic is evident.  
The attack on Iraq sent mixed messages to the region about American 
commitment to democracy. For some, it was seen as a warning to which they responded 
defensively by publicly embracing democracy to signal to the U.S. that they submit to its 
wishes and so should be left alone. Representatives from Libya and Syria were prominent 
in expressing their willingness to embrace democracy.156 Those with a history of 
liberalization presented themselves as examples to emulate – Kuwait and Morocco’s 
statures were elevated internationally and regionally. Their “democracy” was viewed as a 
badge of honor that they proudly flaunted. A Kuwaiti guest boastfully claimed that the 
small city-state of Kuwait enjoyed democracy long before the United States became a 
nation.157 Others were hopeful that America would be successful in spurring democracy 
in Iraq, particularly, and the region generally. Given the dire social, political, and                                                  
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economic circumstances of the region, one guest reasoned that supporting American 
promotion of democracy may be necessary in spite of the region’s distrust or distaste of 
the U.S.158   
Towards the end of 2003 and beginning of 2004, a reversal of trends began to 
materialize – the frames began gradually to change from the general concept of 
democracy to an esoteric understanding. As early as 2001, Arab guests were warning of 
the possible negative backlash of American promotion of democracy. A guest expressed 
the belief that American pressure may encourage secularists to support Islamists, whom 
secularists would not normally endorse, to oppose American demands because it is 
perceived as an external threat trying to impose its wishes on the state.159 Increasingly, 
democracy began to be closely associated with America. Arabs supportive of the concept 
of democracy were keen to differentiate their goals and distanced themselves from the 
U.S. One guest proffered that there is a pressing need to extricate democracy from 
American interests.160 Another guest clarified that the Palestinians are seeking democracy 
for its own value and not those of American interests.161 Arab democracy advocates also 
expressed some resentment toward perceived American hijacking of the issue of 
democracy. The resentment is partly due to perceived American culpability in supporting 
undemocratic regimes. A guest insisted that democracy is favored and demanded in the 
region and was a concern before America took any interest in the Arab people’s plight for 
democracy. He charged that America stifled and continues to impede the growth of 
democracy by supporting authoritarian regimes.162   
In 2004, the frames of democracy changed. A reversal of trends between 
favorable and unfavorable articulations occurred. While favorable expressions decrease 
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by 22.6 percent, unfavorable expressions increase by 21.1 percent. The majority of the 
expressed articulations of democracy for the year were unfavorable – close to 42 percent 
of the utterances were negative. The increased negativity may be due to failed 
expectations and disillusionment with America. In spite of the region’s criticisms, some 
retained the hope that perhaps America would be successful in implementing democracy 
in Iraq and the region. In 2002, when America launched its program, the majority of the 
utterances were favorable – 42.3 percent of the expressions were favorable compared to 
35.9 percent unfavorable articulations. However, with the release of the Abu Ghraib 
prisoner abuse photos, those who were favorable of American support were undermined. 
Positive articulations on democracy were increasingly drowned by criticism of the U.S. 
as the situation in Iraq continued to deteriorate. Positive references on democracy came 
consistently from Iraqi and Palestinian government affiliates.  
The increased insecurity and violence in Iraq and other countries such as Saudi 
Arabia flamed the region’s anger against perceived American failure to fulfill its 
promises, worsening the situation for Arabs and Muslims. Malaysian Prime Minister 
Mahathir Mohamad asserted that unlike in the past, Muslims were being targeted for 
discrimination in the United States and this discrimination has become rampant and 
routine.  Muslims wishing to travel to America faced increased restrictions and reduced 
numbers of student visas.163            
Evidence suggesting that the region is viewing democracy as inherently American 
is clear in 2004. A common perspective associating American democracy with death and 
destruction began to emerge. One guest made the emotional plea “What kind of 
democracy and freedom are these at a time when the sons of our people are still being 
slaughtered?”164  During a televised poll viewers were asked if they believed in “U.S. 
democracy.”  At different intervals during the show, the anchor repeated, “Eighty four 
percent of Arabs do not believe in your democracy ... [they] do not believe in U.S. 
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democracy at all.”165  What is clear in both of these examples is that as “Arabs” and “sons 
of our people” accepting a democracy associated with America is unacceptable. In the 
end, the frame of democracy has changed from democracy as a general good to a 
democracy inherently American in design.   
B. EVIDENCE OF FRAME CONTESTS  
Framing democracy as inherently American, America unwittingly facilitated 
opposing movements’ attacks of its framing. The combination of America’s framing of 
democracy and its attack against Afghanistan and Iraq created powerful incentives for 
movement entrepreneurs to react. Alternatively, America provided its opponents the 
“cognitive liberation” they needed to gain legitimacy to respond and galvanize peoples’ 
consciousness.166 These opposing movement entrepreneurs used the attacks to convert 
initial feelings of indignation to long term moral outrage or sustained antipathy. 
Movement actors have tried to discredit (critical frames), vilify (anti/emotional frames), 
and neutralize (critical and anti/emotional frames) America’s efforts by offering 
competing frames of democracy. In sum, opposing movements have emerged. A frame 
contest is evident and mimics opposing movement dynamics.  
Still, competition to establish a hegemonic interpretation of democracy separate 
from America is on-going on al Jazeera. The frame contest is between “real democracy” 
and “American democracy.”  American democracy is associated with violence, coercion, 
social chaos, military intervention and regime change. Iraqi Vice President Ghazi Ajil al-
Yawir took pride in his country’s political advances, but made clear that “This is the real 
democracy.”167  Chief Editor of the London-based Al-Quds al-Arabi paper, Abd-al-Bari 
Atwan, stated, “We also want democracy to be a genuine democracy that serves the 
region and not a democracy that serves the interests of the U.S. and Israeli hegemony on  
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the region. This is the difference.”168  Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyid Head of the Lebanese 
Hizaballah Political Council, explained, “We cannot respect a democracy behind which 
there are weapons or fleets. This is false democracy. This is the democracy he [Bush] 
wants to impose on the Arab and Islamic world."169  Guests are increasingly sensitive to 
differentiating their own understanding of democracy from perceived American 
interpretations. Association with American democracy is detrimental to their interests and 
is reflected in these attempts to create distance by embracing the “real democracy” 
frames. The frame contest has become so entrenched that Western guests have had to 
defend their representative democracies as “real.”  For example, on the show Opposite 
Direction, Daniel Pipes, the director of the Middle East Studies Forum in the United 
States was asked to comment on polling data that showed Arabs did not believe in 
American democracy. Pipes countered that America’s democracy is real given that 
presidential elections occur every four years to replace the nation’s leader; whereas in 
most states in the region, even when elections are held, the leaders are predetermined or 
permanent.170   
Few guests have defined or outlined what “real democracy” entails. “Real 
democracy” is taken as a self-evident statement. Others seem to imply that “real 
democracy” is one that is compatible with the indigenous culture. President Bashar al-
Asad expressed that Syrians want a democracy that takes into account their national and 
Arab interests and not one conceived to protect or advance Israeli or American 
interests.171  There is consistently recognition for the need to reform, but there is also an 
active search for an alternative to America’s vision. Libya’s Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi 
proposed his indigenous model as more consistent with the spirit of the original Athens 
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democratic model of direct citizen participation.172  Others suggested that Arabs already 
have an authentic democracy – political Islam, and America fears this alternative. A guest 
expressed that if fair democratic elections were held America would not support its 
outcome because Islamists, because of their popularity, are likely to win. He continued to 
comment that America presents democracy as if there are no alternatives, but in fact 
political Islam is widely accepted as a viable alternative to “American democracy.”173 
C. CREDIBILITY REMAINS CENTRAL 
Of the 537 unfavorable utterances recorded, 87.7 percent were not rejections of 
democracy per se, but rather critical of American promoted democracy (see Table 2). 
Even those who expressed antipathy toward American promoted democracy were 
specific in rejecting “American democracy” and not the ideals of traditional democracies. 
Still, the preponderance of views expressed was supportive of the concept of democracy, 
a finding consistent with other assessments. For instance, a 2004 survey of Jordanians 
found that 91 percent of the participants favored democracy as a system of governance.174 
Regardless, the unfavorable expressions do serve to hinder formulating and conveying a 
unified expressed position on democracy which is framed as inherently American. 
Democracy and America have been morphed and combined, and so the criticisms are 
levied indiscriminately. For example, a caller expressed his view that Westerners were 
engaged in a campaign to impose their beliefs and norms on Arabs even while they 
violated those very norms when these principles conflicted with their interests – Western 
advocacy of democracy is merely a slogan to seduce Arabs into docility.175 In another 
example a guest offered, “... if we want to spread democracy, then it cannot be along U.S. 
lines. Only a crazy person would believe that the United States wants democracy in the 
Arab region, in Iraq. If this is the democracy they want in Iraq, then away with such 
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democracy."176 Ironically, while democracy is desirable, because the U.S. is calling for it, 
the Arabs should do otherwise. Rather than focus the debate on the values of democracy 
or voicing unequivocal support for the concept, democracy is conflated with America and 
unabashedly criticized and undermined. 
D. POLARIZED POLITICAL DISCOURSE ON DEMOCRACY   
In 2005 (from 1 January to 1 September), favorable and unfavorable utterances 
reached near parity – 41.3 percent expressed favorable views of democracy while 40.1 
percent expressed unfavorable views (see Figure 3 and Table 1). The political discourse 
has become polarized with neither side (favorable toward democracy and unfavorable 
towards American democracy) gaining a significant relative advantage over the other. 
Specifically, of the 1,373 recorded utterances of democracy, 40.6 percent were favorable 
and 39.1 percent were unfavorable. The views expressed are almost evenly split on the 
issue of democracy and America’s promotion of the concept.  
Emotions also played a central role in polarizing the political discourse. Because 
emotional frames are inherently dramatic, they make for good television and received 
considerable news coverage, which increased their saliency. Emotions fueled the critical 
and anti-U.S. frames and hindered the dominance of pro-democracy frames by 
advocating uncompromising stances. Emotional or anti-U.S. frames equated choosing to 
side with democracy as siding with America. Aligning oneself with America is analogous 
to self-hatred and betrayal, and is shunned as an acceptable option. There is no 
compromising; true Arabs and Muslim do not side with America. Movement actors used 
emotional comments that evoked demands for justice and respect as well as defensive 
solidarity. Their rhetoric could not be dismissed because they expressed and tapped into 
some of the region’s most fundamental concerns, such as the Palestinian’s plight for a 
homeland. The Secretary General of the Palestinian Authority Council of Ministers 
Ahmad Abd-al Rahman expressed, “... the basic question for those who ask for 
democracy and reform from us is that: Don't they see the Israel beast? Don't they see the  
                                                 
176. “Former Jordanian Education Minister on Curricula 'Development',” FBIS 
GMP20040219000024, 18 February 2004.  
62 
Israeli killing of the Palestinians?”177 Following a firefight between U.S. and Iraqi 
security forces against insurgent forces in which civilians were injured, an Iraqi witness 
shared, “A man came with his son to the market [in Al-Qarmah, Iraq] in the morning to 
shop. The Americans hit him. Did he do anything wrong? He burned inside the car. His 
flesh is still here. Is this the democracy Allawi is advocating?”178 Both examples stirred 
the audience’s emotions and called for solidarity in demanding justice, which they feel 
America and its associates are unable or willing to provide.  
In this emotionally charged environment and, given the broad social 
consequences of democracy, people are compelled to choose an interpretation – in so 
doing, the divide becomes more accentuated.179  Emotional frames ensured that those 
who remained proponents of democracy refrained from publicly and explicitly endorsing 
American efforts. This explains the use of the broad “real democracy” or specifying “our 
democracy” frames to distinguish their interpretations from those of the U.S. Democracy 
advocates are compelled to qualify their position. Ayman Nur, one of Egypt’s leading 
democracy and reform advocates, stated that while he is adamant about pushing for 
democracy in Egypt, he would never barter his nation’s sovereignty and risk American 
interference or military occupation for the sake of democracy.180  In clarify his position, 
Nur acknowledged that American democracy is somehow illegitimate, less real or 
propaganda – this acquiescence bolstered the opposition and helped to sharpen the 
polarization.  
E. POLARIZATION AND ITS EFFECTS ON DEMOCRATIZATION 
In competing to dominate peoples’ consciousness, the resulting framing contest 
frustrates and distorts understandings of democracy and creates an implacable schism                                                  
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within the political space. In other words, this result serves neither to educate the people 
about democracy, nor motivate people to act against the state (internal pressure), but 
rather promotes the inadvertent defense of the state and the status quo by opposing 
American demands for change. In the process of formulating a coherent and divergent 
understanding of democracy from that of America, opposing movement activists 
denigrated the importance of democracy. To the audience observing these debates, what 
becomes lost is what exactly is defined as real democracy. Is it Iraq, the U.S., Kuwait, 
Great Britain, Libya, or Lebanon?  Democracy becomes subjective. An al Jazeera 
correspondent asked, “We speak of the democracy of tribes, clans, and communities. 
Does this not mean that the Arab world has been living in democracy for over 2,000 
years without feeling it?  This is so because tribes, clans, and sects have always been 
there.”181  The audience is left wondering if that is the case and Arabs have been living 
democratically without the label of democracy, then why all this talk for change. What 
more could American democracy offer that tribal democracy has not already provided the 
Arabs?  What is America’s real interest?  Absent from the discussions is what democracy 
can do for the average Arab. Democracy remains a malleable abstract concept without 
tangible appeal. Democracy’s definition is broadened to mean everything and nothing 
concomitantly. Democracy has been defined as Israeli repression, freedom of opinion, 
Palestinian right to political power, respect for individual choice, Saudi enforcement of 
sharia, and reestablishment of Iraqi unity. Alternatively, the polarization accentuated by 
emotions leads to, at minimum, confusion and, at maximum, total rejection of 
democracy.  
Inarguably, Middle Eastern states are responding to increased American pressure 
as is evident in the elections in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. However, a polarized political 
discourse detracts from the internal pressure necessary to compel the states to loosen their 
autonomy of the political space and democratize. President Hosni Mubarak has been in 
power for 24 years, and the recent election has done nothing to change this situation. The 
Saudi regime has held power for 73 years; the municipal elections do not threaten its 
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longevity. This is partly due to the fact that states’ threat perception of the internal 
opposition or internal pressure is low.  
The 2005 Egyptian election supports this assessment. Mubarak’s regime 
disregarded domestic and international demands and orchestrated the election in a 
manner most favorable to its interests. The popular Muslim Brotherhood was banned; 
only three weeks of campaigning was allowed; international observers were rejected; and 
the new election laws stipulate that independent candidates must secure endorsements 
from individuals of bodies such as the parliament, which is dominated by Mubarak’s 
ruling party.182 These decisions indicate that Mubarak did not feel the need to 
compromise – he did not have to contend or concede to internal pressure. Had internal 
pressure been a factor, interests other than those of the regime would have reflected in the 
decisions. The low voter turnout further substantiates the regime’s perception of a lack of 
internal pressure – just 23 percent of available voters took part in the elections.183 Had a 
regional consensus reflected in the media, greater pressure could have influenced 
Mubarak’s decisions. Because no such consensus existed, the regime maneuvered freely. 
Lacking an incentive to make substantial political changes, the regime makes reforms 
necessary to strengthen its power (i.e. economic liberalization, increase defense spending, 
cosmetic political liberalization, etc.) to retain the status quo. 
In fact, the polarized discourse serves as a defense for the state. In a show of 
defensive solidarity, opponents to American pressure discard their demands of the state to 
present a unified opposition to a perceived external threat. In the process the states are not 
only shielded from external threats but also from internal threats. The polarized political 
space radicalizes the positions (you are either with us or them) and moderate or alternate 
options become extinct. Those against American efforts attack those that seem 
conciliatory and undermine democracy proponents’ demands of the state. Ironically, 
groups that would have otherwise been united in calling for the states to change have 
become divided over when they should make such demands. While one group views the 
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changed international structure as an opportunity to press for democracy – the time is 
now. Another group proposes that demands on the state should be postponed until the 
external threat is defeated – the time is later. As these preferences compete, the state 
becomes increasingly insulated from direct challenges. Given this scenario, the 
probability of a transition to democracy decreases.    
F. CONCLUSION 
In sum, the findings presented support the conclusion that a consensus on 
democracy has not been reached. A consensus of opinion on the issue of democracy 
could have served to exert indirect pressure on the state in the absence of organized and 
mobilized political parties for democratic changes. Instead, the data indicates that the 
political discourse as reflected on al Jazeera is evenly polarized. American intervention 
has encouraged the formation opposing movements, and consequently, diluted the 
internal pressure which a coherent public opinion might have been able to yield. 
Emotions serve to maintain the divide and ensure that no one side dominates (favorable 
and unfavorable). While emotions fuel critical and anti-US frames, it hinders the 
dominance of pro-democracy frames. Given that democracy is generally supported in the 
region, pro-democracy frames will remain present. The parity between these 
diametrically opposed positions is evidence of the polarization of the political discourse 
and signals to the state that the threat of internal pressure is weakened. In this 
environment, states can implement cosmetic changes at their leisure and without fear of 
great consequences. In the end, this polarization leads to maintenance of the status quo 
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V. CONCLUSION  
“Who cares about al Jazeera and who cares about democracy in the Middle East?”  
Realist like John J. Mearsheimer may say that whether states in the Arab world are 
democratic or not is irrelevant so long as they do not conflict with American interests. 
Besides, all this talk of promoting democracy is merely a facade for realpolitik concerns. 
American politics is rife with ideological appeals and inconsistencies. Politicians 
customarily stoke emotions to gain support for their policies. Words that evoke emotions 
such as freedom, liberty and democracy are commonly used. However, the use of these 
emotionally laden words, do not necessarily mean that they represent actual objectives. 
Because of American cultural propensity to liberal thoughts and optimistic outlooks, 
American policies have to be shrouded in idealistic verbiage to mask fundamentally 
realist calculations and to entice popular support.184  
Regardless of why we engage in rhetoric and the liberal use of words like 
democracy, words are not trivial; words have consequences. When Ayatollah Khomeini 
announced his rhetoric, of exporting Iran’s revolution across the globe, the world took 
notice because of the potential for his words to inspire actions.185 When Ambassador 
April Glaspie warned Saddam Hussein in equivocal terms, it was her words that 
propelled Saddam to action for he believed that his invasion of Kuwait would be tolerated 
if not sanctioned by the U.S.186 Dismissing talk as merely rhetoric is costly. Likewise, 
engaging in rhetoric carelessly is equally as harmful. Information technology has helped 
to raise the stakes; while in the past a verbal faux pas was relatively manageable because 
of limited coverage internationally, with the advent of 24-hour satellite televisions news 
stations, internet blog sites, and satellite radios, etc., information travels faster, wider and 
with less control. Consequently, when misstatements are made they are more difficult to 
correct because of the decentralization of the information infrastructure. While it is 
preferable to avoid miscommunications, they are likely given globalization and the 
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variety of cultural sensitivities. As such, monitoring and analyzing the targeted 
audience’s reception is essential to align the presented information in a manner consistent 
with the desired outcome. I analyzed the expressions reflected on al Jazeera to understand 
how the region is responding to America’s demands for democracy. While al Jazeera is 
the medium under observation, it is social movement theory that facilitates analyzing the 
manifested reactions. This chapter reviews the previous chapters’ contributions, 
addresses some possible criticism and closes with some final words.   
A. CHAPTERS IN REVIEW 
In Chapter I, I outlined why the thesis is relevant by discussing the importance of 
democracy, the literature on democracy in the Middle East, and the policy implications.  
Spectacular terrorist attacks have caused America to reassess its policies in search of a 
solution capable of combating terrorism. In light of the favorable research of the impact 
of democratic structures on domestic and international behavior, American policy makers 
are attracted to democracy as an effective option to contain terrorism. Among its many 
appealing characteristics, from a policy perspective, the ability of democracies to 
moderate extremist tendencies through inclusion and participation is highly desirable. 
The rationale is that if America can alter the conditions that supposedly breed terrorism, 
then terrorism can be defeated. Democracy is a system of governance that impacts the 
social, economic, and political aspects of society and would fundamentally alter the 
conditions currently present in the Middle East. Consequently, democracy promotion in 
the Middle East has become an integral aspect of American foreign policy. This policy, 
however, is not without risk, as the example of Turkey’s democracy showed.  
Responding to Turkish popular opinion, the Turkish parliament opposed American 
demands to use Turkey as a launching base for its advance into Iraq. 
Literature on American promotion of democracy in the Arab world has been 
sparse given that American emphasis of the region is relatively new. To date, Uncharted 
Journey is one of the few authoritative and systematic works on American efforts in the 
region. Research and scholarship from other areas indicate that democracy promotion is 
far from a fixed science.  Democracy promotion does not equate to changes in policies in 
the same direction.  America’s record at effecting democratization has been mixed and 
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inconsistent.  In spite of financial investments and military intervention, Haiti, which lies 
within its hemisphere, remains resistant to democratic change and is unstable.  Chile, on 
the other hand, has been successful at transitioning to democratic norms.    
This research is relevant for social movement theorists, policy makers, and 
military strategists. For theorists, the research suggests a broader range of application. 
This includes analyzing and comparing different compositions of transnational 
organizations to include those composed of states versus those composed of non-
governmental organizations and assessing how group composition impacts state behavior 
as well as oppositional movement formation. For policy makers, this study suggests 
reevaluating the utility of subordinating democracy promotion as a foreign policy 
objective. Democracy is essentially a domestic policy option; in making democracy an 
explicitly stated foreign policy objective it creates the perception that democracy is 
strictly a foreign agenda and engenders resistance. American policy makers may have 
more success at persuading the region to embrace the concept by disassociating 
democracy from the American government and allowing non-governmental agencies to 
advocate its usefulness as a general good. For military strategists, transitional 
democracies or increased demands for change create volatile operating environments. 
Contingency plans must account for a wider assortment of political outcomes in support 
of national political objectives. The establishment of democracies in the region does not 
guarantee support for American interests, so secondary and tertiary bases and resources 
from the region must be secured to maintain a forward and operational presence. To 
improve the military’s ability to achieve its tasks efficiently, personnel training and 
investment should focus on educating military members of the region’s historical and 
cultural norms to minimize miscommunications and misunderstandings that serve to 
undermine American interests. 
In Chapter II, I provided background information to place democracy and 
American promotion of democracy into context, which helps in understanding the 
region’s reaction and social movement theory’s applicability. I reviewed the various 
definitions of democracy, covered the America’s history of promoting democracy in the 
region, and provided a current assessment of its efforts.  In reviewing the definitions of 
democracy, it becomes apparent that democracy is highly subjective, for it is a “contested 
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term.” Scholars have manipulated its meaning further to fit their criteria.  Nonetheless, in 
spite of the variation, some commonalities do exist within this diversity, and one 
common point is on the issue of elections. Most definitions of democracy contain some 
electoral process that incorporates mass participation. The key point, however, is to 
recognize that a variety of democracies exist and to appreciate the difficulty of promoting 
an ideal that, in reality, does not exist in practice or scholarship. This reality has led to the 
charge that American promotion has never been about democracy but rather about 
stability (status quo) in the forms of polyarchies.   
Still, democracy promotion has been an interest and part of the rhetoric of 
American presidents from Woodrow Wilson to George W. Bush. As discussed in Chapter 
I, democracy was viewed as a tool to minimize unnecessary warfare and advance 
economic prosperity. In the Middle East, however, other considerations, such as 
depriving Soviet access to the region’s natural resources, took priority. Even after the end 
of communism and the spread of democracy, the region was largely ignored by American 
democracy promoters. Maintaining stability and supporting regimes capable of ensuring 
that stability in the region was preferred to empowering the people  until 2001.Thereafter, 
democracy promotion was pursued not for empowering Middle Easterners, but for 
enhancing American security.  
Current assessments of U.S. efforts have been tepid. States such as Jordan, Egypt, 
and Saudi Arabia that have expressed support for democratic reforms have not taken 
substantial measures to support their affirmations. The actions they do take lead to little 
or no significant change; they continue to impede democratic progress. The authors of 
Uncharted Journey add that focusing on civil society, women’s issues, and economic 
liberalization have not proven effective at pressuring the states to democratize. Instead, 
foreign support of these programs has benefited the states. In the case of women’s issues, 
increasing the number of women in government is a simple way for regimes to improve 
their image while not changing their substance. The authors suggest that these unintended 
consequences result from the insufficient number of Middle East experts with democracy 
promotion experience – both skill sets (Middle East expertise and democracy promotion  
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experience) are necessary to improve efficiency. Additionally, the authors cite that the 
U.S.’s lack of a coherent strategy is impeding its effectiveness as efforts are 
uncoordinated and conflicting.     
In Chapter III, I presented the thesis’ theoretical framework and methodology. I 
began by reviewing opposing movement dynamics, followed by frame contests, then al 
Jazeera and its role as a communicative platform, and ended with the methodology. I 
used social movement theory as a framework because it covers several dimensions of 
behavior that are applicable when analyzing Arab reactions to American promotion. 
Specifically, social movement theory looks at structural or environmental factors, group 
dynamics and individual behaviors. In other words, it is a holistic approach to 
understanding individual and group behavior within a fixed context because these various 
levels interact and influence subsequent actions. Given that my focus was on analyzing 
Arab reactions, then this application is appropriate. My application, however, differs 
from the conventional usage of the theory. Traditionally, social movements are groups or 
individuals who are non-state actors that pressure the states for policy and or political 
change. Though America’s campaign does not fit this basic characteristic because a   
state (the U.S.) rather than a group of individuals is the agent, it is engaged in the same 
functions as a social movement. Specifically, social movements mobilize their resources, 
which may include people, media, finances, etc., and engage in interpretive struggles 
(frame contests) to persuade the states, elites, public, and by-standers to support their 
agenda. American democracy promoters are engaged in these same functions. American 
policy makers have mobilized their resources particularly their financial and media 
resources and engaged in frame competition to persuade the region and the state to 
embrace democratic change. So while there are fundamental differences between a state 
as a social movement actor and groups of individuals as social movement actors the 
application is still apropos since the focus of this thesis is on opposing movement 
formation or Arab reaction. Alternatively, the Middle East experiences and interprets 
America’s promotion of democracy as if it were a social movement to fundamentally 
change the society and they are responding accordingly. 
Social movement theory explains that structural changes, such as wars, economic 
depressions, splits among ruling elites, and new international norm, etc., create openings 
74 
that movement actors may interpret as favorable for action. American advocacy for 
democracy helped to create an atmosphere favorable to push for change. Also, because 
demands for change inevitably lead to a restructuring of costs and benefits, favorable for 
some and unfavorable for others, such demands are inevitably contested. If the U.S. is 
successful in persuading the states to transition to more democratic governance, some 
members of society stand to lose their political positions, material comfort and prestige to 
the advantage of another group of individuals. Consequently, opposing movement 
formations are likely in reaction to U.S. demands, because like the reactions observe 
within social movement theory and in case studies such as the pro-life and pro-choice 
dyads, demands for societal changes that impact the broader society inevitably leads to 
contestation.   
While opposing movement dynamics can manifest in activities such as pro-Iraqi 
war and anti-Iraqi war demonstrations, this dynamic is also observable in analyzing the 
discourse reflected on the media. Opposing movements try to persuade the state and 
mobilize support by offering compelling frames or interpretations. These frames, 
however, are not instantly accepted and are contested by opposing interest groups, the 
public, the media, etc.  To persuade the Middle East, American policy makers have relied 
heavily on the media, particularly satellite television. In fact, to maintain continuous 
access to this resource, America invested in launching al Hura satellite television station 
so that its messages are conveyed. According to social movement theory, movements 
create the conditions for opposing movements. For instance, anti-abortion protesters 
picketing of abortion clinics will likely result in opposing movement actions. While pro-
abortion advocates could take their protests to the local court, the likelihood is that the 
pro-abortion group will counter the anti-abortion protesters at the clinic. In other words, 
social movements establish the setting for contestation. Similarly, American use of 
satellite television to advance its frames encouraged opposing movements to compete in 
offering alternate frames on satellite television.   
I used al Jazeera as a platform to observe and analyze the frame contests over the 
issue of democracy and how it is associated with America. I selected to focus on al 
Jazeera because of its popularity and because of its reputation for presenting a wide 
variety of views. I also selected to focus on al Jazeera because, comparatively speaking, 
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the discourse reflected on the station is uncensored. Since the object of the research was 
to observe Arab reactions to understand its impact for U.S. policy, I wanted to have 
access to a broad range of perspectives with minimal regional state influence. In 
analyzing how the discourse impacts democratization, I used Marc Lynch’s research, 
which showed that when a consensus of opinion exists it can serve to exert indirect 
pressure against the state for action which could include democratization. Al Jazeera is 
well suited for this role, given that regional states and American policy makers monitor 
the station and this attention impacts their perception and policy options.   
My method involved reviewing 576 records of Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service (FBIS) records on al Jazeera and annotating the connotation associated with each 
articulation of the word “democracy” when “America” is also referenced within the same 
context.  Each articulation was categorized into respective frames such as pro-democracy, 
anti-democracy, etc.  The timeframe covered was 1 January 1998 to 1 September 2005.  
A total of 1,373 data points were then tabulated and graphed to observe any trends and 
conduct quantitative analysis. 
In Chapter IV, I explained my main findings, which are that frames have changed 
since the commencement of American promotion of democracy in the Middle East; a 
contest of frames is evident; credibility remains a central problem in advancing American 
interests, and polarization of the political space has occurred.  In light of these findings, I 
explored the implications for states and democratization. Since 2002, the democracy 
frames reflected on al Jazeera have changed. First, from 2002 to 2003, likely due to the 
high expectations of American success in implanting liberal reforms, democracy was 
viewed favorably and as an independent ideal. As such, in 2003, favorable expressions 
reached its peak at 46.4 percent compared to 34.6 percent unfavorable frames. Then, 
from the end of 2003 to 2004, democracy and America began to be closely associated, 
and the discourse became increasingly unfavorable as disillusionment with American 
progress began to crystallize. By the end of 2004, democracy and America became 
conflated – the frame of democracy has changed from democracy as a general good to a 
democracy inherently American in design. Consequently, favorable expressions 
decreased by 22.6 percent while unfavorable expressions increased by 21.1 percent. 
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A frame contest is also evident, and the competing frames are between “real 
democracy” and “American democracy.” “Real democracy” is presented as self-evident 
and not requiring of additional clarification, whereas “American democracy” is portrayed 
as not only American in design, but also associated with state collapse, prisoner abuse, 
violence, death, and general destruction. The frame contests have reflected prominently 
since 2004. There were also attempts to present other alternatives.  One option called for 
a democracy that reflects Arab cultural and historical sensitivities and is separate from 
American or Israeli interests. Another alternative was political Islam. These alternative 
frames however were secondary to the dominant “real” or “American” frames.   
American credibility remains a key factor impacting the region’s reception of its 
messages. Recalling from Chapter III that frame resonance or success is a product of 
salience and credibility, America lacks the credibility to advance its interest undeterred in 
the region. The majority of unfavorable frames (critical and anti) have been critical of 
U.S. democracy promotion efforts – 87.7 percent of total unfavorable frames comment on 
American credibility.    
By 2005, a clear polarization of the political discourse on democracy developed; 
while 41.3 percent expressed favorable views of democracy, 40.1 percent expressed 
unfavorable sentiments. Looking at the total number of recorded data also shows that 
polarization of the political discourse is ongoing – 40.6 percent were favorable while 39.1 
percent were unfavorable. Emotions served to sharpen and maintain the polarization by 
making siding with “American democracy” synonymous to betrayal of one’s Arab or 
Muslim identity.  
B. CRITICISMS 
Like any contested field, this thesis is likely to result in multiple criticisms.  
Though I cannot and do not address all possible criticisms, I would like to focus on three.  
First, some could argue that al Jazeera’s influence may be waning and thus the relevance 
of this research may soon prove dated. Second, others could counter that the polarization 




true polarization of discourse.  Lastly, some could be inclined to dismiss the relevance of 
the research because, after all, Arabs reject anything that is associated with America  
democracy promotion is not different.    
Some could argue that al Jazeera’s influence may be waning and, thus, the 
relevance of this research may become dated. While this thesis uses al Jazeera as a 
communication platform it could have easily used al Arabiya or Abu Dhabi television 
outlets. Al Jazeera was selected for the reasons outline above. The point of this research 
is not on al Jazeera but on how American democracy promotion resembles social 
movement behavior and thus encourages opposing movement reaction. Consequently, the 
relevance of this research is not intrinsically tied to the fate of al Jazeera. Other platforms 
can also serve to observe opposing movement dynamics for these dynamics remain 
consistent in light of American behavior.       
Others could counter that the polarization reflected in the data may be a result of 
the combative nature of the media more so than a true polarization of discourse. Though 
it may very well be possible that the polarization reflected in the data is symptomatic of 
television’s nature, with its tendencies to show oppositional views, the impact on the 
audience remains the same.  Alternatively, when a consensus on an issue is reflected on 
television it can indirectly impact or serve as a source of internal pressure against the 
state. Whether that polarization is a result of actual polarization of the political discourse, 
which I maintain it is, or a reflection of the nature of television, is irrelevant because the 
outcome (polarization) has the same effect on the audience (state).        
Some could be inclined to dismiss the relevance of the research because after all 
Arabs reject anything that is associated with America so democracy promotion is no 
different. The data strongly refutes this conclusion. In 2003, the region was generally 
optimistic that America would help bring about democratic reforms. The attack against a 
fellow Arab state did not diminish their enthusiasm. Generalizations such as these do not 
help in understanding how to bridge an understanding and formulate sound policies. 
While anti-Americanism is common of the area, it does not mean that American related 
concepts are immediately rejected. 
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C. FINAL WORDS  
Democracy promotion is a difficult and potentially rewarding endeavor, but 
requires finesse to avoid unintended backlashes. An elemental part of that promotion is 
selling an interpretation. The U.S. has attempted to sell the Middle East an interpretation 
of democracy that reflected more of what was at stake for American interests than how it 
would address the Arab world’s concerns. America called for the Middle East to embrace 
democracy to make the U.S. and the Western world safe – democracy was framed as 
inherently American. Because of the similarities between American behaviors and those 
of social movements, the region reacted as if faced with a social movement. Oppositional 
movements formed and engaged in frame contests on al Jazeera television. The frame 
contests have resulted in the polarization of the political discourse. In light of this 
development, the states, which monitor al Jazeera to keep abreast of emerging issues that 
may impact their policies, breathe a sigh of relief. For most Arab states are well versed in 
the practice of “divide and rule.”  So long as the political discourse remains divided, the 
states can rule freely. In conclusion, American promotion of democracy has been 








− 23 February: Osama bin Laden issued his fatwa calling for Muslims “to kill the 
Americans and their allies – civilians and military.”187  
 
− 7 August: Al-Qa’ida attacked U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es 
Sala’am, Tanzania.   
 
− 28 October: Israel and Palestinians signed the Wye Memorandum. The document 




− 7 February: After four decades of power King Hussein of Jordan, the region’s 
longest ruling leader, passed away. His son Prince Abdullah, an untested leader, 




− 10 June: Syrian President Hafez al-Assad died. His son Bashar al-Assad assumed 
the presidency.   
 
− 28 September: Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount. The second Palestinian 
intifada – al Aqsa. began.   
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− 30 September: Twelve-year-old Mohammed al-Durra was shot and killed by 
Israeli fire as his father held him in his arms. The image was captured and 
broadcasted on Arab television and became an iconic figure of the second 
intifada. Shortly after, the top Arab recording artists released the song “Jerusalem 
Will Return to Us” in which the boy’s name is featured prominently.188    
 




− January: President George W. Bush inaugurated.   
 
− February: Prime Minister Ariel Sharon assumed power. 
 
− 11 September: Al-Qa’ida attacked the World Trade Center and Pentagon using 
civilian airliners as weapons. Over 3,000 people killed.189 In response to the 
attack, President Bush promised to lead a "crusade” to “rid the world of evil-
doers.”190 Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda, who the Taliban sheltered in 
Afghanistan, were the prime suspects.  America demanded that the Taliban 
extradite Osama bin Laden and close the terrorist training camps. The Taliban 
refused.   
 
− October: Congress passed the USA Patriot Act to help combat domestic terrorism.  
Consequently, thousands of persons of Middle Eastern background were detained, 
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interviewed and investigated.191 The Bush Administration requested that al 
Jazeera minimize its coverage of Osama bin Laden and tone down in “vitriolic” 
reporting.192  
 
− 7 October: American and British forces began their bombing campaigns against 




− January: President Bush said Iran, Iraq, and North Korea “constitute an axis of 
evil.”194   
 
− 3 January: Israel announced plan to pull out of the West Bank.   
 
− 12 March: Israeli troops took over refugee camps in the Gaza Strip and 
reoccupied Ramallah in the West Bank.   
 
− 28 March: Arab League proposed a two-state settlement which involved 
exchanging peace for Arab lands with Israel. Israel confined Yasser Arafat to the 
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occupied territories and demolishes his compound. Bush urged Arafat to control 
the violence for “he 'can do a lot more' to stop the terrorism.”195   
 
− May: UN Security Council amended sanctions against Iraq to allow for 
humanitarian related supplies.    
 
− June: President Bush announced his intent to make the spread of democracy a 
fundamental pillar in U.S.-Middle East foreign policy.196   
 
− 12 September: President Bush addressed the United Nations calling for stricter 
resolutions against Iraq.   
 
− November: The UN Security Council approved of resolution 1441 which called 
for new weapons inspections in Iraq.   
 
− December: Secretary of State Colin L. Powell launched the Middle East 
Partnership Initiative to promote reform and democracy in the Muslim world.  




− 20 January: Ariel Sharon dismissed European efforts to a peace settlement and 
voiced his preference for an American plan.198   
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− 27 January: Hans Blix, head of the UN weapons inspection team, released the 
team’s report and briefed they had not found a “smoking gun.”199  
 
− 28 January: During his State of the Union address, President Bush announced that 
America would lead an attack against Iraq if it does not fully comply with UN 
demands.200   
 
− February: The Belgium Supreme Court ruled that Sharon and other military 
commanders involved in the 1982 massacre of 800 Palestinians in Lebanon could 
be prosecuted.201   
 
− 19 March: President Bush announced the commencement of hostilities against 
Iraq.202  
 
− 9 April: Baghdad fell to American forces.  
 
− May: Mahmoud Abbas became the first Palestinian Prime Minister.203   
 
− 1 May: Bush declared the end of major combat operations.  
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− 12 May: Suicide bombers attacked compounds housing Westerners in Riyadh, 
Saudi Arabia – 35 people were killed including eight Americans.204  
 
− July: The Iraqi Interim Government was inaugurated. 
 
− 19 August: Suicide bombers attacked UN Headquarters, Baghdad, Iraq.  UN 
Chief Envoy Sergio Viera de Mello is killed.   
− 29 August: Ayatollah Muhammad Bakr al-Hakim and 80 others were killed in a 
suicide attack in Najaf, Iraq.    
 




− January: Thousands of Iraqis demonstrated in Baghdad and Basra in support of 
direct elections.   
 
− 21 January: Israeli Air Force attacked the Beka’a valley in Lebanon in retaliation 
of Hizbullah missile strikes.206   
 
− 2 February: Prime Minister Ariel Sharon ordered plans to begin for the evacuation 
of settlements in Gaza.207   
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− March: Thousands protested in Gaza, Lebanon, Turkey, Yemen and Egypt 
following Israeli forces’ assassination of Hamas’ founder and spiritual leader 
Ahmed Yassin who was eighty years old and wheelchair bound.208 Calling the 
text unbalanced, the U.S. blocked a UN resolution sponsored by Algeria and 
Libya which would condemn Israel for the Yassin killing.209 The Iraqi Governing 
Council signed the interim constitution.   
 
− 31 March: A mob of Iraqis killed and mutilated four American civilian 
contractors in Fallujah, Iraq.   
 
− April: Fighting erupted in southern Iraq following the closing of anti-American 
Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr’s al Hawaz newspaper.   
 
− 29 April: Abu Ghraib prison pictures of abused prisoners were made public.   
 
− 8 May: Internet video of the beheading of American civilian contractor Nicholas 
Berg was released.   
 
− 17 May: Izzedin Salim, head of the Iraqi Governing Council was assassinated. 
 
− May: 29: Gunmen attacked oil company compounds in Khobar, Saudi Arabia, 
took hostages from a nearby residential compound, and escaped through a police 
cordon.   
 
− 18 June: Paul Johnson Jr., an American citizen living in Saudi Arabia was 
beheaded.   
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− 28 June: The U.S. officially transferred sovereignty to the Iraqi government – 
Iyad Allawi sworn in as Iraqi Prime Minister.   
 
− August: Coalition forces engaged in fighting in Najaf, Iraq with Sadr’s followers.   
 
− September: Secretary of State Collin Powell declared that genocide is occurring in 
Darfur, Sudan.210   
 
− October: Car bomb attacks in Sinai, Egypt; at least 30 killed and over a hundred 
wounded.211   
 
− 9 October: Afghanistan held its first presidential elections.   
 
− November: American forces launched major assault operations in Fallujah, Iraq.   
 
− 2 November: President Bush re-elected for a second term.    
 
− 11 November:  After 30 years of leadership, Yasser Arafat died in Paris, 
France.212    
 
− 6 December: Gunmen attacked U.S. consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.   
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− 9 January: Mahmoud Abbas won the Palestinian presidential elections. The 
Sudanese government and the Sudan Popular Liberation Movement (SPLM) 
reached a peace agreement to end the country’s civil war. 
 
− 30 January: Iraqis voted in the elections for the National Assembly. 
 
− 14 February: Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hairi killed in a car bomb attack.  
 
− 22 February: Hundred protested against Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and 
called for multi-party elections.  
 
− 4 March: Saudi Arabia held municipal elections. Qatar’s Sheik Hamad bin 
Khalifa al-Thani announced plans to hold parliamentary elections in 2005 or early 
2006.   
 
− 26 March: Thousands demonstrated in Manama, Bahrain, demanding democratic 
reforms.  
 
− 21 April: Israeli forces began removing equipment from the Gaza Strip.  
 
− 26 April: After mounting international pressure, Syrian troops left Lebanon. 
 
− 3 May: Oman court sentenced alleged conspirators who hoped to overthrow the 
sultan and establish an Islamic state.   
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− 7 May: Egypt arrested Muslim Brotherhood spokesman Essam el-Erian.     
 
− 26 May: Bush announced plan to give the Palestinian Authority 50 million dollars 
for housing and construction.   
 
− 21 June: The first Kuwaiti woman, Massouma al-Mubarrak, sworn in as a cabinet 
minister. 
 
− 21 July: Thousands protested government’s plans to cut fuel subsidies in Sana, 
Yemen.   
 
− 23 July: On the anniversary of the 1952 “bloodless revolution,” suicide bombers 
attacked Egypt’s tourist town in Sharm el-Sheikh, 88 people were killed and more 
than 200 were injured.  
 
− 4 August: Prince Abdullah became king following the death of King Fahd on 1 
August. 
 
− 17 August: Israel troops began evicting Jewish settlers from the Gaza Strip. 
 
− 28 August: Alliance of Sunni Association of Muslim Scholars and Muqtada al 
Sadr’s movement rejected the draft Iraqi constitution. 
 
− 31 August: Hundred of pilgrims died in a stampede in Baghdad, Iraq. 
 
− 1 September: Thousands celebrated Muammar al-Qadhafi’s 36th anniversary in 
power in Tripoli, Libya.  
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Table 4. Articulated Frames (FY01). 


























Table 5. Articulated Frames (FY01-pre—9/11). 
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Table 6. Articulated Frames (FY01-post—9/11). 
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Table 7. Articulated Frames (FY02). 




































Table 8. Articulated Frames (FY03). 
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